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Introduction 
The state aid control policy covers the rules and mechanisms that ensure the protection of competition
through state aid control. State aid control is of utmost importance because it prevents a benefit in any
form that state public authorities provide on a selective basis to economic agents, giving them advantage
over others. 
Countries in the Western Balkan (WB) region, as signatories to the Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment (SAA) with the EU, should abide by EU rules on competition and state aid, including regulation /
control and assistance received by economic operators, both domestic and foreign investors. Most WB
countries have fully adopted EU state aid legislation in their national laws. However, enforcing these rules
remains "inefficient", especially in terms of introducing an effective and efficient state aid control sys-
tem.
At the same time, the policies of attracting foreign investment in the WB region in the last decade have
been implemented through a significant number of programs, measures, forms of investment support
that include fiscal and non-fiscal measures that fall into the category of state aid. 
While countries in the region, according to the EU, do not effectively and transparently control state aid,
and provide a range of incentives for foreign investment, in the race to attract investments, countries in
the region are in "competition" to provide better conditions for investors that could lead to the so-called
"race to the bottom."
The aim of this study is to review the current situation regarding the development of state aid policies
in countries in the region in the context of attracting foreign investment and to identify possible impli-
cations for the regional economies from incentive-based policies.  
The study provides an overview of the placement and status of state aid to support foreign investment
in countries in the region to understand the place and importance in the context of building a functioning
market economy according to EU standards and highlighting both shortcomings and opportunities through
such policies. This study also seeks to establish a link between the inflow of foreign investment and the
impact of state aid. The study provides an overview, conclusions, and recommendations for progress in
this area, which are addressed to both decision makers and the public. 
The primary methodological approach in the conducted research is a qualitative method used to gain in-
sight into the key issues as well as the reasons arising from the findings to formulate the proposed rec-
ommendations. Qualitative data are collected through a review of regulations and policies of countries in
the region, EC progress reports on countries, other research in the field of attracting investment through
incentive measures for the region and other countries, data and information by policy holders and imple-
menting parties. This analysis includes a quantitative review of relevant indicators related to state aid
and foreign direct investments and an analysis to determine the degree of correlation and causality be-
tween direct aid and foreign investments and the growth of gross domestic product in the region.
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1. STATE AID POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WESTERN BALKAN 
COUNTRIES  
State aid is of great importance within the EU and is defined as an advantage / benefit in any form that
the state public authorities provide on a selective basis to enterprises / economic agents.1 It is part of
the competition policy, covered by Chapter Eight of the EU acquis, the negotiation chapter. This chapter
has not yet been opened by a candidate country or a country that has started negotiations, and it is ex-
pected to be the last of a series of chapters.2
The main reason why state aid is controlled is that any enterprise / business entity that receives support
from the state (at any level) gains an advantage over its competitors. Therefore, the Treaty for the Func-
tioning of the EU - TFEU3 - generally prohibits state aid, unless justified by reasons for achieving general
economic development.4
In order to ensure compliance with this prohibition and the rules of exemption, the EU legal acts apply
equally to the whole of the EU, and the European Commission (EC) is responsible for ensuring that the
state aid granted complies with EU rules.
According to the EU acquis, to be State aid,5 a measure needs to have these features:6
l there has been an intervention by the State or through State resources which can take a variety of forms
(e.g. grants, interest and tax reliefs, guarantees, government holdings of all or part of a company, or providing
goods and services on preferential terms, etc.);
l the intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis, for example to specific companies or
industry sectors, or to companies located in specific regions;
l competition has been or may be distorted;
l the intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States.
Despite the general prohibition of State aid, in some circumstances, government intervention is necessary
for a functioning and equitable economy. Therefore, the Treaty leaves room for several policy objectives
for which State aid can be considered compatible or allowed in the internal market in line with EU rules.7
6
1) Note: Thus, subsidies granted to individuals or general measures that are open to all enterprises are not state aid (e.g. general tax
measures or employment legislation).
2) Status May 2020, for the two WB countries that have started negotiations with the EU, according to the 11th accession conference
from 11/12/2019 in Serbia, 18 out of 35 chapters were opened and two closed. According to 12th conference for accession of Mon-
tenegro as of 10/12/2018, 32 chapters out of 33 are opened and 3 pre-closed, while the last chapter 8 is expected to be opened
during the year and is conditioned by the initial five benchmarks. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/mon-
tenegro/  
3) Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, TFEU, Lisbon Treaty.
4) Article 107 (3) of the Lisbon Treaty states that the following may be considered to be compatible with the common market: a) aid
to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underem-
ployment, and of the regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and social situation; b) aid to promote
the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member
State; c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not ad-
versely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest; d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation
where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to an extent that is contrary to the common interest;
e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission.
5) European Commission, Competition, State Aid Control, seen February 2020, available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition
/state_aid/overview/index_en.html 
6) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/101/regional-state-aid
7) European Commission, Competition, State Aid, State Aid Procedures, available at: https://ec.euroition.ecom
/state_aid/overview/state_aid_procedures_en.html 
Western Balkan countries, as signatories to the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the
EU, should abide by EU rules on competition and state aid, including regulation / control of the assistance
received by economic operators, both domestic and foreign investors, including those in the special eco-
nomic zones. 
The European Union regulates incentives offered by the member states to the companies in line with
competition and state aid provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In
this Treaty, Articles 101, 102, 107 and 108 cover the parts related to competition and state aid - prohibiting
any distortion or restrictive practices that may affect competition in the internal market, but allowing
some exceptional granting of state aid.
The EU recognizes three general types of state aid: horizontal, regional, and sectorial assistance:
1) Horizontal aid is aimed at solving or mitigating market failures, usually covering some kind of ex-
ternalities (i.e. the social costs caused by a particular business activity, regardless of business ex-
penses or income). Such externalities can be associated with any type of business, regardless of the
location or sector of the firm. Funding for this type of state aid is mainly channeled into R&D proj-
ects, saving and restructuring, encouraging employment, protecting and promoting the environment,
and creating (and sustaining) small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
2) Regional aid is aimed at a (geographical) territory / region where the standard of living is signifi-
cantly lower than the EU average or toward regions that are at a disadvantage compared to national
averages, for example, due to unusually high unemployment rates or other problems of a socio-eco-
nomic, geographical or structural nature. The purpose of the regional aid financing is to promote
activities that can provide a basis for long-term regional development; as such, the focus is on initial
investment assistance, and operational assistance is granted only under very exceptional circum-
stances. 
3) Sectorial aid focuses on specific sectors that go through conversion processes, such as the coal,
steel and shipbuilding sectors, or special sectors that are considered difficult to fully adapt to market
competition powers (such as banking, airlines or the automotive sector). Sectoral assistance, however,
is administered in such a way as to reduce as much as possible any damage that would be inflicted
on competitors. 
The Western Balkans region8 in more than a decade has recorded a strong investment support policy,
and especially foreign direct investments, by providing various benefits and support measures through
various fiscal and non-fiscal measures. 
Many of them are visible through the so-called "boom" of the establishment and opening of special eco-
nomic zones (SEZ).9 The users of these zones, mainly foreign companies, were provided with state aid,
significant both in terms of amount and type with an opportunity cost as a direct cost or through lost in-
come. 
7
8) The Western Balkans refers to the six countries in the region: North Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Montenegro.
9) Special or free economic zones in the region have different names, but are essentially forms belonging to the general definition of
SEZ example: “geographically delimited areas administered by a single body, offering certain incentives (generally duty-free importing
and streamlined customs procedures, for instance) to businesses which physically locate within the zone”; definition of WB, or OECD:
Special Economic Zones (SEZs): are larger estates and could be considered cities on their own. They usually cover all industrial and
service sectors and target both foreign and domestic markets. They provide an array of incentives ranging from tax incentives to
regulatory incentives. In addition, they permit on-site residence.
State aid granted to enterprises / companies in these zones largely falls into the category of regional
state aid. According to Article 107, paragraph 3a,10 of the TFEU, regional assistance is defined as "aid to
promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is
serious underemployment."11 The level of state aid granted is conditioned by the level of development of
the region, measured through the GDP of the region in relation to the average GDP of the EU28. Hence,
only regions with GDP per capita that is below 75% of the EU28 average are eligible for state aid.12
In addition, poorer regions have the right to receive more value as a percentage of investment in the
form of state aid than more developed regions. The amount of state aid also varies depending on the size
of the investor or recipient of state aid. The intensity of aid is lower for large enterprises than for small
and medium enterprises. Horizontal aid aimed at SMEs is also available and compatible with regional aid
in some cases. 
Table 1: Maximum allowable limit / intensity of state aid in the EU 
Source: Adapted from Monitoring Special Economic Zones in the Western Balkans, OECD; for more details see
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/compilation/state_aid_15_04_14_en.pdf, page 320
The countries in the WB region are currently at different stages of the European integration process and
all have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, albeit at differ-
ent times. With the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs), which include provi-
sions relating to state aid, including competition protection, countries are also committed to meeting
them within a given timeframe. Namely, Albania signed the SAA in 2006 (it was awarded the status of
EU candidate in 2014), Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the SAA in 2008 (application for EU accession in
2016), North Macedonia signed the SAA in 2001 (awarded EU candidate status in 2005, and is still awaiting
a date for the start of negotiations), Kosovo signed the SAA in 2014 (EU has facilitated high-level dialogue
between Kosovo and Serbia since 2012), Montenegro signed the SAA in 2007 (awarded EU candidate
status in 2010) and is already deeply involved in negotiations, Serbia signed the SAA in 2008 and was
awarded EU candidate status in 2012, and it is also in the advanced stages of negotiations.
The SAA is an important requirement to the accession to the European Union, which calls for the intro-
duction of a national system of state aid control. The obligation to introduce state aid monitoring systems
stems from the SAA, but also from the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) as well as the
Energy Community Treaty. National state aid control systems (competent control bodies that have differ-
ent forms and institutional setups) are provided as transitional mechanisms, as monitoring state aid after
countries join the EU will be carried out by the supranational body, the European Commission. As the ex-
8
10) “aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious un-
deremployment”
11) Regional Aid, defined in the Law on State Aid Control of the Republic of Macedonia Official Gazette 145/2010, Article 4, paragraph
11 states: Regional aid is aid that is in line with the objectives of the regional policy of the Republic of Macedonia and which improves
productive initial investments or job creation related to investments.
12) RN Macedonia according to the nomenclature for regions, target territory is NUTS 2, written in the Regulation on Regional Aid,
2012, Article 4, paragraph 6.
Regional GDP as % Max. rates in % for Additional assistance for small 
of EU28 GDP average large enterprises and medium enterprises
<75% 15-10% +20% for small
>75% 30%
<60% 40%
<45% 50% +10% for medium
perience of Central and Eastern European countries shows, the effective implementation of national state
aid rules is one of the basic conditions for concluding negotiations on the competition policy chapter. 
Each of these SAAs contains an article prohibiting state aid as a distortion of competition13 and needs to
be applied. The SAA is part of the process of integrating candidate countries into the European Union,
through which they are committed to harmonizing their national legislation with the EU acquis. While
none of the WB candidates have yet opened negotiations on Chapter 8 of Legislation,14 which regulates
competition policy and state aid, as SAA signatories, all those SAA countries have pledged to align their
state aid with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union within five years of the respective
agreements. 
State aid granted to enterprises in the special economic zones within the economies of the Western
Balkans generally falls into the category of regional aid and is subject to quantitative restrictions similar
to those in EU economies by transposing part or all of EU regulation into national legislation. According
to state aid laws, and in line with EU regulations,15 the level of aid granted to each enterprise is calculated
based on the size of the investment and number of employees. 
In practice, this means that the countries of the Western Balkans are currently limited in the amount of
state aid they can provide, but not in the type of aid that companies can receive. They can provide a wider
range of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for investors than in EU countries. This gives significant advan-
tages especially to regional competitors who are already members of the EU, who according to the EC
Guidelines for Regional State Aid for 2014-202016 should provide detailed evidence that the selected aid
tool has the least distorting effects on competition compared to any other available instrument: a con-
dition that often more aggressive forms of subsidies, such as direct labor subsidies, fail to meet. 
Even though EU members cannot provide labor-related incentives, Western Balkan countries that are
not yet full members of the EU still can attract investment in labor-intensive industries by providing
state aid to subsidize labor. Additionally, the manner and degree of regional division of the countries on
the NUTS levels also provide regional assistance to the entire territory of the country, as is the case with
North Macedonia. This can also be viewed from the perspective of neighboring EU member states such
as Bulgaria and Romania, which have similar labor costs to Western Balkan countries, while as EU member
states have significant advantages, which is why foreign investors would probably rather choose to be lo-
cated in a country that is a member of the EU than in a country that is outside, mainly due to the overall
environment and conditions for business operations offered by the Union.
9
13) SAA with Albania, Article 71, SAA with BiH, Article 71, SAA with Macedonia, Article 69, SAA with Kosovo, Article 75, SAA with Mon-
tenegro, Article 73, SAA with Serbia, Article 73, for Macedonia see https://eur-lex.eurohtpa.eu/resource = cellar: 3ce414a8-cc67-
4879-a8cc-17b9c4745465.0007.02 / DOC_1 & format = PDF  
14) Маy, 2020
15) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
16) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013XC0723%2803%29
1.1. Overview of the institutional setting of state aid control in the Western Balkan countries  
Table 2: Review of laws in the field of state aid, the institution in charge of implementing and control-
ling state aid policy and state agencies for investment support 
Albania
Source: Data from World Bank data and annual reports of state aid competent authority.
State Aid Legislation 
To align its legislation in the field of state aid with the EU legislation, Albania adopted the Law on State
Aid in 200517 and the amendments to the Law and the relevant bylaws in 2016. The state aid law covers
all sectors except agriculture and hatcheries. 
Competent body for control of state aid 
The competent body for implementation and control of state aid is the State Aid Commission (SAC) -
Komisioni i Ndihmës Shtetërore. Pursuant to Article 16 of the Law on State Aid, the SAC is an operationally
independent body. The Commission is composed of five members and is chaired by the Minister of Finance
and Economy. The other members are appointed by the Council of Ministers (Government). According to
Article 17 of the Law, the Commission is responsible for preparing an annual report on state aid and sub-
mitting it to the Council of Ministers.
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Country Law Competent institution Investment Support Agency
for state aid control
Albania Law on State Aid State Aid Commission Albanian Investment 
Development Agency (AIDA)
Bosnia and Law on the state State Aid Council Foreign Investment Promotion 
Herzegovina aid system Agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(FIPA)
Kosovo Law on State Aid State Aid Commission Kosovo Investment and 
Enterprise Support Agency 
(KIESA)
North Law on the state Commission for the Agency for Foreign Investments and 
Macedonia aid system Protection of Competition Export Promotion of the Republic 
of North Macedonia 
(Investinnorthmacedonia)
Serbia Law on state State Aid Control Development Agency of Serbia 
aid control Commission (RAS)
Montenegro Law on state Competition Agency Montenegro Investment 
aid control Agency (MIA)
Albania 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Population (mil.) 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
GDP (in mil. USD $ 12,044 11,927 12,891 12,320 12,776 13,228 11,387 11,861 13,025 15,103
GDP growth (%) 3.4 3.7 2.5 1.4 1.0 1.8 2.2 3.3 3.8 4.1
FDI (% of GDP) 11.2 9.1 8.1 7.5 9.8 8.7 8.7 8.8 7.9 8.0
FDI (in mil. USD $) 1,345 1,090 1,049 918 1,254 1,150 990 1,044 1,023 1,204
State aid 
(% of GDP) 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.5 0.2 0.26 0.11 0.14 0.22
17) Law on state Aid, Albania, http://www.mete.gov.al/doc/20060509102817_law_on_state_aid.pdf
State aid transparency
According to the 2019 EU Progress Report, state-related legislation is in line with the acquis and the SAA
and is largely in line with Articles 107 and 108 of the EU Treaty.18 The law prescribes the conditions and
procedures for granting state aid and aims to align the country with the EU General Block Exemption Reg-
ulation of 2014.19 According to the EC, further improvement of state aid control is needed. The Ministry of
Finance and Economy, which is the institution in charge of approving state aid, determines the institutional
setting of the SAC. Therefore, the SAC cannot be considered a fully operational independent body as it is
set by Law and in line with the SAA requirements. The Law on State Aid requires that before the introduction
of any new measure, it should be approved by the SAC as compatible with the Law. The SAC has the right
to order the entities to return any illegally acquired or incompatible state aid, and such a decision may be
challenged before a competent court. However, so far, the SAC has not ruled to return the state aid. This
calls into question the administrative capacity of the Commission for the enforcement of state aid return
decisions, and it must be seriously strengthened. The Commission must show that it is still implementing
the provisions of the Law. Namely, the SAC's state aid inspection track record is insignificant. In the last
reporting period (referring to the first half of 2019), the SAC inspected ten state aid schemes, six of which
were ex officio, without rejecting a single scheme. It is extremely important that the rules of state aid are
reflected in the public finance management strategies and to increase the advisory role of the SAC before
adopting any provision of state aid at the central and local levels. The implementation of state aid rules
must also be monitored during the implementation of major projects between Albania and other countries.
It is also recommended that state aid providers, in accordance with the Law, notify the SAC of state aid
measures before they appear, so that the corrective function ex-ante can be performed. It is considered
that due to the fact that the SAC directly reports to the Government, there are not enough instruments
for parliamentary oversight of state aid, but it is realized indirectly through the parliamentary oversight of
the Government.
Investment support measures 
The Law on Foreign Investments20 in Albania provides equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors
in the use of state aid. The Albanian Investment Development Agency (AIDA) - Agjencia Shqiptare e Zhvil-
limit të Investimeve, which is in charge of supporting investment in Albania, lists specific measures to
stimulate investment:21
l Profit tax of 8% if the profit is distributed as a dividend and 0% if the company's turnover is lower
than 8 million leks (65,000 euros). The general profit tax rate is 15%;  
l Personal income tax of 0% for gross salary of 26,000 leks (210 euros), which is defined by law as the
minimum wage; 13% for gross salary between 26,000 leks and 150,000 leks (210 euros and 1,210
euros) and 23% for gross salary over 150,000 leks (1,210 euros);
l Value added tax of 0% for procurement of raw materials for export production and for goods from a
special list determined by the Council of Ministers and preferential rates of 6% and 10% for certain
products (the general VAT rate is 20%);
l Use of AIDA Funds for Competitiveness, Creativity, Innovation and Start-Up Businesses;
l Stimulation for capital investments by allowing deferred tax payment for up to 12 months (or more, if
the investment lasts longer and under exactly certain rules set by the Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omy);
11
18) Commission staff working document, Albania 2019 Report, 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-albania-report.pdf
19) Commission regulation EU No 651/2014, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014R0651-20170710&from=EN
20) Foreign Investment Act, Albania, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/3/albania-foreign-investment-act
21) Albanian Investment Development Agency, http://aida.gov.al/
l Protection of foreign investments from direct or indirect measures for expropriation or nationalization,
except in special cases defined by law and in the public interest;
l The right of foreign investors to repatriate income and assets;
l Judicial protection of foreign investors in terms of legal rights related to their investments;
l Positive discrimination against foreign investors - by decision of the Council of Ministers, the Govern-
ment provides financial support to foreign investors in civil proceedings with third parties;22
l Foreign investment companies are allowed to own land;23
l Exemption from customs duties - for emigrants who have continuously lived in another country for a
period of not less than 12 months and who are returning to Albania. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Source: Data from World Bank data and annual reports on state aid from the competent authority.
State Aid Legislation
To harmonize the legislation in the field of state aid with the EU legislation, Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) passed the Law on the State Aid System in 2012,24 and it has partially adopted the relevant bylaws.
The Law on the State Aid System covers all sectors except agriculture, fisheries, and the military indus-
try.
Competent state aid control body 
Pursuant to Article 4 of the Law on the State Aid System, the competent authority for approval, monitoring
and control of state aid is the State Aid Council (SAC) - Vijeće.25 Article 7 of the same Law states that the
SAC is a public institution that carries out its activities independently and is obliged to ensure consistent
application of the Law on the State Aid System to the entire territory of BiH. The Council is composed of
eight representatives appointed by the Council of Ministers of BiH (3), the Government of Republika
Srpska (2), the Government of the Federation of BiH (2) and the Government of the District of Brcko (1),
with a term of four years. The chairmanship of the Council is on a rotating basis with a one-year term of
office of the Chairman. The Council has a Secretariat in charge of organizational, technical and adminis-
trative matters. According to Article 19 of the Law, the SAC is accountable to the Council of Ministers of
12
22) http://www.mete.gov.al/doc/web_fdi_report_english.pdf
23) http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Doing_business_in_Albania_2012/$File/Doing_business_in_Albania_2012.pdf
24)http://www.fmf.gov.ba/v2/userfiles/userfiles/file/D_Pomoc/Zakon%20o%20sistemu%20drzavne%20pomoci%20u%20Bosni%20i%
20Hercegovini.pdf
25) http://www.szdp.gov.ba/?lang=bs
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Population (mil.) 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3
GDP (in mil. USD $) 17,614 17,177 18,645 17,227 18,179 18,558 16,212 16,913 18,080 20,162
GDP growth (%) -3.0 0.8 0.9 -0.7 2.4 1.1 3.1 3.1 2.1 3.6
FDI (% of GDP) 0.8 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.7 2.9 2.4 1.9 2.6 2.4
FDI (in mil. USD $) 139 444 472 392 313 545 383 313 464 489
State aid 
(% of GDP) n/a n/a 1.2 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 n/a
BiH (Government) for its work and is required to prepare an annual report on state aid and submit it to
the Council of Ministers. The competent bodies for designing and implementing state aid measures are
the Council of Ministers of BiH (for the entire territory of BiH) and the governments of the three entities:
Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska and Brcko District.
State aid transparency 
According to the 2019 EU Progress Report, state-related legislation is partially in line with the acquis
and the SAA.26 Namely, the relevant bylaws regulating the state aid policy have not been adopted equally
throughout the country. For example, acts of de minimis aid and assistance for services of general eco-
nomic interest were adopted only in the Federation of BiH, but not in the other two entities. Also, the
map of forms of regional aid has not yet been prepared. It should show the different forms of state aid
that companies can receive in the second level geographical areas (NUTS II). The functioning of the SAC
is quite burdened with decision-making procedures along ethnic lines, i.e. at least one representative
from each ethnic community needs to support a decision for it to take effect (Badinter's rule). As a result,
any state-sponsored bylaw, even if in full compliance with the acquis, may not be adopted or put into
practice. The SAC should demonstrate independence in relation to state aid institutions (governments
and ministries at central, entity and local levels) and establish a solid system of state aid control and im-
plementation of its decisions, especially in the area of major projects being implemented between BiH
and other countries. According to the Law on the State Aid System, the state aid provider must inform
the SAC on the state aid measures before their implementation starts. The SAC may order a refund of
state aid funds increased for interest, if it is determined that it is illegally acquired or incompatible with
the Law and bylaws. The Council may initiate ex officio official investigations into state aid if there are
sufficient indications that it was illegally granted. The capacity of the SAC to execute decisions is weak.
Namely, the Secretariat, which has only seven employees, is not able to meet its obligations. Republika
Srpska still does not fully pay its share to finance the Council, despite a ruling by the competent court.
In the last few years, the SAC has made very few decisions, all of which have been either positive or have
not established existence of state aid elements. This raises additional serious concerns about the SAC's
capacity to enforce its decisions. Many of the state aid measures have been introduced by the competent
authorities without them informing the Council at all and having been approved by it. The compliance of
existing state aid schemes with EU rules arising from SAA obligations is still at a very early stage. BiH
must ensure the transparency of all state aid measures that are being implemented. It is considered that
due to the fact that the SAC directly reports to the Council of Ministers, there are not enough instruments
for parliamentary oversight of state aid, but it is ensured indirectly through the parliamentary oversight
of the work of the Government.
Investment support measures 
Due to the specific state governance system, the state aid policies in terms of attracting foreign direct in-
vestments differ from the central to the entity level. What is identical is that the Law on Foreign Direct In-
vestment Policies of BiH27 and the Law on Foreign Investments of the Federation of BiH28 and the Law on
Foreign Investments in Republika Srpska29 equate foreign with domestic legal entities in the possibility of
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26) https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-bosnia-and-herzegovina-analytical-report.pdf
27) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/35/bosnia-and-herzegovina-foreign-investment-law
28) http://www.fic.ba/uimages/zakoni/FBiH%20Law%20on%20Foreign%20Investments.pdf
29) http://www.fipa.gov.ba/publikacije_materijali/zakoni/CLEANSED%20TEXT%20OF%20THE%20LAW%20ON%20FOREIGN%20IN-
VESTMENTS%20RS.pdf
using state aid. The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina (FIPA) - Agencija za
unapređenje stranih investicija u Bosni i Hercegovini, which is the central state agency for attracting invest-
ments, states the specific state aid policies in order to stimulate investments:30
General policies that apply to the entire territory of BiH are:
l National treatment of foreign investors;
l Opening an account in a domestic business bank in any convertible currency;
l Free employment of foreign nationals, unless otherwise provided by law;
l Protection from nationalization, expropriation and requisition, except in case of public interest and
with fair market compensation;
l National real estate ownership treatment;
l Free repatriation of operating profit;
l Exemption from customs and tax duties for the purchase of equipment, except for passenger vehicles
and vending machines and games of chance;
l Use of benefits from free zones (exemption from VAT on imported products, use of public goods with
preferential compensation, etc.).
Policies that apply only to the territory of the Federation of BiH are:
l Exemption from 30% of the profit tax, if reinvestment in production equipment is made in the amount
of at least 50% of the value of the current profit;
l Exemption from 50% of the profit tax for all years, if in a period of five years there is reinvestment in
equipment from own funds in the total value of 20 million KM (10 million euros) of which at least 4
million KM (2 million euros) in the first year;
l Tax exemptions for new employees who will stay at work for at least one year.
Policies that apply only to the territory of Republika Srpska are:
l Reduction of the profit tax base for the value of each investment intended for procurement of equip-
ment and real estate in function of the production activities;
l Reduction of the tax base in the amount of personal income tax and contributions for employers that
provide at least 30 new jobs per year;
l Subsidies for employments for investments with a minimum value of 2 million KM (1 million euros)
and at least 30 new jobs depending on the level of development of the area in the amount of 3,500
KM (1,750 euros) per employee in the developed and medium developed units, and 5,000 KM (2,500
euros) per employee in the underdeveloped and especially underdeveloped local self-government units;
l Financial support of 15% of the value of the investment for investments worth over 25 million KM
(12.5 million euros) and which create at least 100 new jobs, regardless of the level of development of
the area in which they invest. 
Policies that apply only to the territory of Brcko District are:
l Company fee exemption;
l Reimbursement of court costs for registration of newly established enterprises;
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30) http://www.fipa.gov.ba/informacije/povlastice/strani_investitori/default.aspx?id=141&langTag=sr-SP-Cyrl
l Reimbursement of utility costs;
l Reimbursement of construction permit costs and approvals;
l Reimbursement of costs in the amount of the difference between the cost of utilities paid by the com-
pany and the price paid by households;
l Reimbursement of paid employment contributions for newly employed persons;
l Remuneration in case of maternity leave in the amount of 100%;
l Stimulation for the employer in the amount of 50% of the total health insurance duties for newly em-
ployed persons;
l Compensation for new investments in fixed assets up to the amount of the determined and paid profit
or income tax for the year in which the procurement was performed.
Kosovo
Source: Data from World Bank data and annual reports on state aid from the competent authority.
State Aid Legislation 
To align the legislation in the field of state aid with the EU legislation, Kosovo passed the new Law on
State Aid in 2017,31 and by 2019 had adopted a part of the relevant bylaws. The Law on State Aid covers
all sectors except agriculture, fisheries, and agricultural processing.
Competent state aid control body 
According to Article 9 of the Law on State Aid, the competent authority for approval, monitoring and
control of state aid is the State Aid Commission (SAC) - Komisioni i Ndihmës Shtetërore. The SAC is an
independent body composed of five independent expert members appointed by the Assembly of the Re-
public of Kosovo, with a term of three years and the possibility of re-election. According to Article 8 of
the Law, a Sector for State Aid (SSA) was established within the Ministry of Finance with seven employees,
which provides professional, technical and administrative assistance to the Commission. The SSA is re-
quired to prepare an annual report on state aid and reports to the Assembly for its work.
State aid transparency 
According to the 2019 EU Progress Report, state-related legislation is largely in line with the acquis and
the SAA and is largely in line with Articles 107 and 108 of the EU Treaty.32 The European Commission ob-
serves that the SAC members were first elected at the beginning of 2019 due to which formally the SAC
is the body that really has the operational power to assess, approve or prohibit certain measures, to per-
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31) https://mf.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/AB373100-5DE7-45A4-BE96-CD1EF11E79AE.pdf
32) https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-kosovo-report.pdf
Kosovo 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Population (mil.) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
GDP (in mil. USD $) 5,654 5,830 6,692 6,500 7,072 7,387 6,440 6,715 7,228 7,939
GDP growth (%) 3.6 3.3 4.4 2.8 3.4 1.2 4.1 4.1 4.2 3.8
FDI (% of GDP) 7.1 8.4 8.0 4.5 5.3 2.7 5.3 3.6 4.0 4.0
FDI (in mil. USD $) 403 490 535 293 371 200 343 244 287 319
State aid
(% of GDP) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
form ex post control, i.e. to request the return of illegally or incompatibly acquired state aid. The SAC ad-
ministrative capacity is constantly being strengthened with the support of the British Embassy and the
IPA Twinning Program.33 Nevertheless, the SAC's capacity to enforce the law is considered inappropriate,
making it ineffective. In the last five years, the SAC has not made a single decision regarding state aid,
and its role has been reduced to drafting texts of bylaws on state aid. The department does not have the
capacity to analyze existing state aid schemes and to keep an appropriate register for them. That process
is still ongoing, while preventing the possibility for state aid ex-ante notification and ex-post control. As
a result, several state aid measures implemented at central and local levels, especially for large companies
from different sectors (e.g. telecommunications), have not been properly reported and are insufficiently
researched. Awareness of state aid providers about the rules in this area is very weak and must be sig-
nificantly strengthened. It is believed that because the SAC is now directly accountable to the Assembly,
this is a useful tool for parliamentary oversight of state aid policies in the future.
Investment support measures 
The Law on Foreign Investments34 in Kosovo provides equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors
in the use of state aid. The Kosovo Investment and Enterprise Support Agency (KIESA) - Agjencia për
Përkrahjen e Investimeve dhe të Ndërmarrjeve në Kosovë, as a state agency aimed at encouraging in-
vestment, lists specific measures to stimulate them:35
l A flat 10% profit tax paid quarterly;
l Taxpayers with income of less than 50,000 euros may choose to be taxed at 10% on the basis of real
income or on an assumed tax basis;
l Dividend income tax is 0%;
l Company losses can be transferred for up to 7 years;
l Profit tax paid abroad by residents is approved up to the maximum amount of tax liability in Kosovo;
l The personal income tax rate is scalable: 0% for salary up to 960 euros per year, 4% for salary between
961 and 3,000 euros per year, 8% for salary between 3,001 and 5,400 euros per year and 10% for
salary over 5,400 euros per year;
l Subsidy of 50% of the salary for each newly employed person who will be kept at work for more than
1 year;
l Certain goods are exempt from customs duties.
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33) http://www.legalpoliticalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/GLPS-State-Aid-Eng.pdf
34) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/211/kosovo-law-on-foreign-investment
35) https://kiesa.rks-gov.net/page.aspx?id=2,3
North Macedonia
Source: Data from World Bank data and annual reports on state aid from the competent authority.
State Aid Legislation
To align the legislation in the field of state aid with the EU legislation, North Macedonia in 2010 passed
the new Law on State Aid,36 and it has adopted the relevant bylaws. The state aid law covers all sectors
except agriculture and fisheries.
Competent state aid control body 
According to Article 10 of the Law on Control of State Aid, the competent body for evaluation and super-
vision of any form of state aid is the Commission for Protection of Competition (CPC).37 Pursuant to Article
26 of the Law on Protection of Competition,38 the CPC is an independent state body with the capacity of
a legal entity, independent in its work. The CPC is composed of five members appointed by the Assembly
of the Republic of North Macedonia with a five-year term and the right to one re-election. The Commission
has a Professional Service that is responsible for the professional, normative-legal, administrative, ad-
ministrative-supervisory, material-financial, accounting, information, and other matters. The CPC is ac-
countable to the State Assembly with the obligation to submit an annual report on its work.
State aid transparency
According to the 2019 EU Progress Report, state-related legislation is in line with the acquis and almost
fully in line with the SAA and is largely in line with Articles 107 and 108 of the EU Treaty.39 There is a need
for certain amendments to the Law in terms of support of minor importance (de minimis) and in the imple-
mentation of the Law in certain forms of state aid and specific sectors in order for it to be fully aligned with
the acquis. It is noted that the state aid map at the central and local levels is outdated and not fully trans-
parent. According to the Law, state aid providers must notify the CPC of state aid measures for assessment.
Otherwise, the CPC has the right to conduct an ex officio investigation and, if it finds that the state aid is
inappropriate or against the Law, can order its return. In this section, the EC notes that the administrative
capacity of the Commission required to control and enforce decisions related to state aid is not sufficient,
and that it is poorly staffed, with outdated equipment and a small budget. For example, in 2012-2014 and
2015-2018, the Ministry of Transport and Communications introduced a state aid scheme to support an air-
line. For the period 2018-2021, although the public call was twice unsuccessful, in the third attempt, state
aid was granted to the same airline. The CPC must confirm the compliance of this decision with the principles
of the market economy, aviation and the provisions of the SAA. Moreover, the provisions of the Law on Fi-
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Macedonia 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Population (mil.) 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
GDP (in mil. USD $) 9,402 9,407 10,495 9,745 10,818 11,362 10,065 10,672 11,280 12,672
GDP growth (%) -0.4 3.4 2.3 -0.5 2.9 3.6 3.9 2.8 0.2 2.7
FDI (% of GDP) 2.8 3.2 4.8 3.5 3.7 0.5 2.9 5.1 3.4 5.1
FDI (in mil. USD $) 260 301 508 338 402 61 297 549 381 649
State aid 
(% of GDP) 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
36) http://kzk.gov.mk/category/zakon-za-drzhavna-pomosh/
37) http://kzk.gov.mk/
38) https://dejure.mk/zakon/zakon-za-zashtita-na-konkurencijata
nancial Support of Investments adopted in 2018, which provides for state subsidies for the private sector,
are not harmonized with the acquis. In 2018, the approved state aid was 0.2% of the GDP. In the future, the
implementation of state aid rules in major projects implemented by North Macedonia in cooperation with
other countries must be under the control of the CPC, and protective measures must be introduced to
ensure that state aid measures are free from conflict of interest. It is believed that because the SAC is now
directly accountable to the Assembly, this is a useful tool for parliamentary oversight of state aid policies.
Investment support measures 
The Constitution and laws in North Macedonia provide equal treatment to domestic and foreign investors
in the use of state aid. Institutions directly responsible for attracting investment are: the Agency for Foreign
Investments and Export Promotion of the Republic of North Macedonia (Investinnorthmacedonia)40 and the
Directorate for Technological Industrial Development Zones - a body within the Government that manages
the unification of administrative affairs in all industrial zones in the country.41 The Government is involved
in this process with the Minister without portfolio in charge of attracting foreign direct investment and the
Sector for Attracting Investments within the Ministry of Economy. In case of receiving state aid, the Agency
for Foreign Investments and Export Promotion signs the agreement with the investor on behalf of the Gov-
ernment. The main policies and measures of state aid for attracting investments in North Macedonia are:42
l 10% flat tax rate (with certain exceptions provided by law);
l 0% profit tax on reinvested net profit before tax;
l Financial support for new employments (20% of the paid net salary for the newly employed person, if
the net salary is at least 50% higher than the minimum net salary provided by law);
l Financial support for establishing and promoting cooperation with suppliers registered in RNM (1% of
the value of the total performed procurements, provided that 15% of the total production input in the
previous year is performed by suppliers registered in RNM);
l Financial support for the establishment of organizational forms for technological development and
research (up to 50% of the total justified costs for industrial research);
l Financial support for investment projects of significant economic interest (funds in the amount of between
2,000 and 4,000 euros per employee; funds in the amount of up to 10% of the realized amount of in-
vestment, but not more than 1 million euros; exemption from paying income tax and personal income
tax; up to 50% of the total justified investment costs for an investment project up to 5 million euros, up
to 25% of the total justified investment costs for investment projects between 50 and 100 million euros,
up to 17% of the total justified investment costs for an investment project over 100 million euros);
l Financial support for the growth of capital investments and revenues (10% of the realized investment,
but not more than 1 million euros);
l Financial support for the purchase of material assets from business entities with difficulties (10% of
the costs for purchasing material assets of the business entity in bankruptcy or liquidation, but not
more than 1 million euros);
l Financial support for business entities that have increased their competitiveness in the market (10%
of justified investment costs, but not more than 1 million euros per year);
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40) http://investnorthmacedonia.gov.mk/
41) http://fez.gov.mk/?lang=MK
42) https://dejure.mk/zakon/zakon-za-finandzidzka-poddrdzhka-na-invedzticii
l Financial support for conquering new markets and increasing sales (20% of justified costs for con-
quering new markets, but not more than 30,000 euros);
l Utilizing the benefits of free economic zones that are managed as state aid in the form of regional
state aid (exemption from paying personal and corporate income tax for the first 10 years; exemption
from VAT and customs duties on goods, raw materials, equipment and machinery up to 500 thousand
euros, depending on the value of the investment and the number of employees; lease of land up to
99 years; free connection of utilities; exemption from paying local utility bills and duties for construc-
tion permits, as well as green customs channels for goods). 
Serbia 
Source: Data from World Bank data and annual reports on state aid from the competent authority.
State Aid Legislation
To harmonize the legislation in the field of state aid with the EU legislation, Serbia adopted the new Law
on State Aid Control in October 2019,43 which replaced the Law on State Aid Control from 2009. At the
same time, the state has adopted the relevant bylaws. The state aid law covers all sectors except agri-
culture and fisheries.
Competent state aid control body 
According to Article 9 of the Law on State Aid Control, the competent body for assessment, supervision, control
and decision making on the basis of the measures and scope of state aid is the Commission for State Aid Control
(CSAC) - Комисија за контролу државне помоћи.44 CSAC is an independent and autonomous organization that
exercises public authority in accordance with the Law. The CSAC is composed of a Council composed of four
members and one President. The bodies are elected by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Parlia-
ment) for a term of five years, with the right to a maximum of two re-elections. The Commission has a Professional
Service that is responsible for performing the professional activities within the competence of the Commission.
The CSAC is accountable to the State Assembly with the obligation to submit an annual report on its work.
State aid transparency 
According to the 2019 EU Progress Report, state-related legislation is in line with the acquis and almost
fully in line with the SAA and is largely in line with Articles 107 and 108 of the EU Treaty and SAA provi-
sions.45 However, the provisions that allow exceptions to the rules of state aid, which apply to companies
in the process of restructuring and privatization, are not in accordance with the SAA and the acquis. Ex-
19
43) http://www.kkdp.gov.rs/doc/propisi/zakon_o_kontroli_drzavne_pomoci_2019.pdf
44) http://www.kkdp.gov.rs/
45) https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-report.pdf
Serbia 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Population (mil.) 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.0
GDP (in mil. USD $) 45,163 41,819 49,258 43,309 48,394 47,062 39,629 40,630 44,120 50,597
GDP growth (%) -2.7 0.7 2.0 -0.7 2.9 -1.6 1.8 3.3 2.0 4.4
FDI (% of GDP) 6.5 4.0 10.0 2.9 4.3 4.2 5.9 5.8 6.6 8.1
FDI (in mil. USD $) 2,929 1,693 4,931 1,275 2,059 2,000 2,343 2,355 2,895 4,107
State aid
(% of GDP) 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.3
isting schemes that include fiscal incentives, which are part of the Law on Profit Tax, the Law on the Per-
sonal Income Tax, and the Law on Free Economic Zones, must be aligned with the acquis. To be in line
with Article 73 (5) of the SAA, the CSAC must adequately inform the EC of decisions relating to the ap-
proval of large amounts of state aid to large economic operators. Moreover, a regional map on state aid
has not yet been developed. In terms of institutions, the EC addresses the work of the Commission for
State Aid Control, which according to the old Law on State Aid Control functioned until mid-October 2019.
The work of the old Commission has been assessed as operationally dependent on the Government, with
extremely poor administrative and financial capacity to execute decisions. In one year (January 2018 -
February 2019), CSAC received 64 notifications and made 15 ex-post controls, but no decision was made
to ban or return any measure of state aid that was not in accordance with the law. Significant strength-
ening of the control over the harmonization of the measures for accumulation of state aid and the pro-
visions of the intergovernmental agreements concluded with non-EU countries is necessary. These
agreements must not guarantee third countries exceptions to Serbia's national law. The state must ensure
that the assistance provided to Železara Smederevo before it is privatized is properly displayed and
recorded in the balance sheets. In January 2019, the competent commercial court declared bankruptcy
of this company, and the court has still not recognized the claims of the state based on the given state
aid. Awareness of state aid rules for both providers and recipients remains extremely low. This is partic-
ularly striking with the small number of complaints in the second instance of the CSAC's decisions, as
well as the small number of ex-ante notifications to the Commission on Introduced or Planned State Aid
Measures. It is expected that the adoption of the new Law on State Aid Control and the start of operation
of the new CSAC will remove much of the noted remarks in the report. The new CSAC will now be directly
accountable to the Parliament, which is a useful tool for parliamentary oversight of state aid policies.
Investment support measures 
The Constitution and laws in Serbia provide equal treatment to domestic and foreign investors in the use
of state aid. Institutions directly responsible for attracting investments are: the Development Agency of
Serbia (DAS) - Развојна агенција Србије46 and the Directorate for Free Zones - an administrative body
within the Ministry of Finance and Economy that performs state administrative affairs in the area of free
zones.47 The main policies and measures of state aid for attracting investments in Serbia are:48
l Financial support for existing jobs (between 20% and 40% of the justified costs for gross salary for a
period of 2 years, depending on the sector, the volume of investment and the level of development of
the region in which it is invested);
l Financial support for newly created jobs (between 3,000 and 7,000 euros for each newly created job,
depending on the manufacturing sector, the volume of investment, the level of development of the
region in which the investment is made and the number of newly created jobs);
l Financial support for procurement of tangible and intangible assets that will be realized during the duration
of the investment project (minimum amount of investment must be between 100,000 euros and
20,000,000 euros, and the support is between 5% and 30% of the justified costs for investment depending
on the importance of the investment for the development, the production sector, the level of development
of the region in which the investment is made and the planned number of newly created jobs);
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46) http://ras.gov.rs/
47) http://www.usz.gov.rs/
48) http://www.ras.gov.rs/podrska-investitorima/zasto-srbija/podsticaji-za-investiranje
l Financial support for greenfield and brownfield investments that may be subject to international trade;
l Subsidies for transfer of construction land (sale of state land at a price lower than the market price in
case of investment of national importance or municipal land in case of investment that promotes local
economic development);
l Exemption from profit tax for a period of 10 years (for investors who employ more than 100 workers
and invest more than 1 billion dinars, i.e. 8.5 million euros);
l Exemption from profit tax for a period of 5 years (for investments in underdeveloped regions under
special conditions provided by law);
l Company losses can be transferred for up to 5 years;
l Utilization of the benefits of free economic zones (exemption from VAT, customs duties, certain taxes
and contributions; free flow of capital; simple and efficient one-stop-shop administration; exemption
from payment of certain local fees and charges; use of transport services, freight forwarding, insurance
and other associated services at preferential prices).49
Montenegro
State Aid Legislation 
To align the legislation in the field of state aid with the EU legislation, Montenegro adopted the new Law
on State Aid Control in October 2019,50 which replaced the Law on State Aid Control from 2011. At the
same time, the state has adopted the relevant bylaws. The state aid law covers all sectors except agri-
culture and fisheries.
Competent state aid control body
According to Article 5 of the Law on State Aid Control, the competent authority for control of adequacy,
purposeful use and return of illegally granted and inadequate state aid is the Agency for Protection of
Competition (APC) - Agencija za zaštitu konkurencije.51 Pursuant to Article 19 of the Law on Protection of
Competition,52 the APC is an independent state body with the capacity of a legal entity. The bodies of the
APC are a Council composed of three members (President of the Council and two members) and a Director.
The Director has one deputy and two assistants, one of whom oversees state aid. The bodies are elected
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49) http://www.ras.gov.rs/podrska-investitorima/zasto-srbija/podsticaji-za-investiranje
50) http://www.azzk.me/dp/doc/Pravni%20okvir/Zakon%20o%20kontroli%20drzavne%20pomoci%202018.pdf
51) http://www.azzk.me/jml/index.php/
52) http://www.azzk.me/dp/doc/Pravni%20okvir/Zakon%20o%20zastiti%20konkurencije%202018%20-%20precisceni%20tekst.pdf
Montenegro 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Population (mil.) 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
GDP (in mil. USD $) 4,159 4,139 4,538 4,088 4,464 4,588 4,053 4,374 4,845 5,504
GDP growth (%) -5.8 2.7 3.2 -2.7 3.5 1.8 3.4 2.9 4.7 5.1
FDI (% of GDP) 37.3 18.3 12.3 15.1 10.0 10.8 17.3 5.2 11.6 8.8
FDI (in mil. USD $) 1,550 758 557 618 446 497 700 227 561 486
State aid
(% of GDP) 1.58 2.1 1.77 1.11 2.88 0.76 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.75
by the Montenegrin government for a four-year term, with the right to re-election. The Agency has a
State Aid Sector that is in charge of professional, administrative and technical matters related to state
aid. APC is accountable for its work to the Government with the obligation to submit an annual report to
the Government, but also to the Parliament of Montenegro.
State aid transparency
According to the 2019 EU Progress Report, state aid related legislation is largely in line with the acquis and
with Articles 107 and 108 of the EU Treaty and the SAA provisions.53 The adoption of the new Law on State
Aid Control and the Amendments to the Law on the Protection of Competition, which strengthens the in-
dependence of the APC in the area of state aid control, is welcomed. However, it is noted that certain im-
portant parts of the acquis, such as banking communication, are still not aligned. Funding rules of services
from general business interest are aligned with EU rules to a considerable extent, but greater demonstration
is required during execution. The APC was launched in July 2018 after the dissolution of the State Aid Control
Commission (SACS), which operated under the old law. Therefore, it does not have a satisfactory track record
of performed controls. The capacity to enforce decisions of both the old and the new institution is assessed
as extremely insufficient, although the unit for state aid control with seven employees who functioned under
the old SACS from the Ministry of Finance was transferred to the newly formed APC. Regarding the operation
of the old SACS, from 2015-2018, a total of 85 decisions were made, of which only 2 were negative. During
the same period, no complaints were received, which indicates the low awareness of participants of the state
aid rules in the process. There is evidence that the SACS has not been properly informed of some measures
approved at the central and local levels (VAT exemption or written off claims for some large companies) or
that it has investigated them improperly. For example, with the 2012 plan to restructure Montenegro Airlines,
the state undertook to financially assist the airline with respect to the "only once and never again" principle.
But even though the plan was partially realized, the state continued to finance the company in order to
keep it in working condition. It is recommended that in the future the APC to strengthen its control over
the implementation of state aid rules in major projects that Montenegro is implementing with third countries.
It must have access to all the necessary information to give appropriate opinions and make binding decisions.
According to the law, the APC’s decisions can be further appealed to the Administrative Court. It is also
necessary to further strengthen the awareness of the rules for state aid of both the providers and the re-
cipients. The APC is directly accountable to the government, but also submits an annual report to parliament,
which is a useful tool for parliamentary oversight of state aid policies.
Investment support measures 
Laws in Montenegro provide equal treatment to domestic and foreign investors in the use of state aid.
Institutions directly responsible for attracting investments are: the Secretariat for Development Projects,
which is a body within the Government, and the Montenegro Investment Agency (MIA) - Agencija za in-
vesticije Crne Gore.54 Pursuant to Article 102 of the Law on Public-Private Partnership, starting in February
2020, the MIA has taken over the affairs, assets, liabilities, documentation and employees of the Mon-
tenegrin Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA).55 The main policies and measures of state aid for attracting
investments in Montenegro are:56
22
53) https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-montenegro-report.pdf
54) http://www.mia.gov.me/naslovna/Agencija
55) https://www.mipa.co.me/me/
56) https://www.mipa.co.me/me/uredba-o-podsticanju-direktnih-investicija/
l Competitive tax system (9% profit tax; 9% PIT for income up to 720 euros and 15% PIT for income
over 720 euros; three tax rates for VAT - 0%, 7% and 19%);
l Subsidies for newly employed persons (between 3,000 euros and 10,000 euros per new employee.
Scoring is performed depending on the amount, sector, effects on exports, technological development,
environment and regional development of the investments, i.e. references and cooperation of the in-
vestor with domestic legal entities);
l For capital investments of more than 10 million euros, which provide at least 50 jobs, funds are allocated
in the amount of 17% of the value of the investment project, without conducting a scoring procedure;
l Utilization of benefits from the free economic zone "Port Bar" (exemption from VAT payments, profit
tax and customs duties; exemption from customs control; preferential treatment in relation to fees for
arranging construction land; use of land and buildings with long-term lease, under fixed conditions).
1.2.  Regional State Aid in the Western Balkans 
In most of the countries in the region, the manner of distribution of regional state aid is determined by
secondary regulation, which is to some extent harmonized with the EU, and where the EU rules regarding
the intensity or limitation of the amount of state aid are mirrored into the national legislation. 
RN Macedonia - Regulation on regional aid 57
In RN Macedonia, regional aid is regulated according to the Regulation on Regional Aid, and it is allowed
on the entire territory of RNM.58 The maximum intensity of regional investment aid is up to 50% of the
justified costs, while the maximum intensity of regional investment aid for small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) is covered by an additional +20% above the established maximum for small enterprises or +10%
for medium enterprises. The beneficiary of the aid is required to provide a financial contribution of at
least 25% of the justified costs. 
Serbia - Regulation on rules for granting state aid 59
The same restrictions, i.e. allowed intensity of state aid, are established in Serbia as in North Macedonia
according to the Decree on state aid, from Article 7 to Article 17 (Part 2), with the maximum intensity of
state aid as a percentage decreasing with increasing investment. For example, for justified costs up to
50 mil euros, the maximum intensity is up to 50%, from 50 to 100 mil euros, it is 25%, and for over 100
mil euros, the intensity is up to 17%. 
Montenegro - Regulation on the criteria conditions and manner of granting state aid 60
Regional aid is allowed on the whole territory of Montenegro, and the maximum intensity of regional in-
vestment aid is up to 50% of the justified costs, while the maximum intensity of regional investment aid
for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is covered by an additional +20% above the established maxi-
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57) Regulation on Regional Aid of RNM, Article 4 Aid intensity and Article 5 Maximum aid intensity Official Gazette 109/2013,
http://kzk.gov.mk/%d1%83%d1%80%d0%b5%d0%b4%b4%d0%b1%d0% b0-% d0% b7% d0% b0-% d1% 80% d0% b5% d0% b3%
d0% b8% d0% be% d0% bd% d0% b0% d0% bb% db% d0% bd% d0% b0-% d0% bf% d0% be% d0% bc% d0% be% d1% 88 /  
58) RNM of NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 is the whole territory of the country
(https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/345175/7773495/MK.pdf)
59) Uredba o pravilima za dodelu državne pomoći ("Sl. Glasnik RS", br. 13/2010, 100/2011, 91/2012, 37/2013, 97/2013 i 119/2014),
http://www.kkdp.gov.rs/doc/propisi/UREDBA%20drzavna%20pomoc.pdf
60) Uredba o bližim kriterijumima, uslovima i načinu dodjele državne pomoći ("Sl. List Сrne Gore", br. 27/10 34/11, 2014), article 7
and 8 http://www.azzk.me/dp/doc/Pravni%20okvir/Uredba%20o%20blizim%20kriterijumima%20uslovima%20i%20nac-
inu%20dodjele%20DP.pdf
mum for small enterprises or +10% for medium enterprises. The beneficiary of the aid is required to pro-
vide a financial contribution of at least 25% of the justified costs. There is a list of sectors where such as-
sistance is or is not allowed. In addition, the maximum intensity of state aid for regional development as
a percentage decreases with increasing investment for large investments for justified costs from 50 to
100 million euros, with the maximum amount for over 100 million euros being up to 34%. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Regulation on the purpose, criteria and terms for granting state aid 61
The regulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina sets a maximum for the area - a maximum of 50% of the in-
vestment if the GDP per capita (NUTS 3) is lower than 45% of the EU level, a maximum of 35% in areas
where the per capita GDP is between 45% and 60% of the EU GDP, and a maximum of 25% for areas with
more than 60% of the GDP per capita compared to the EU level. An additional intensity of +10% exists
in municipalities in which the development index is between 50% and 75% of the Federation average,
and +20% in municipalities in which the development is 75% of the FBH average. For large investments,
the intensity decreases as the investment increases, with the maximum amounting to 100 million euros. 
Kosovo - System establishment status
Kosovo is in the process of establishing and restructuring state aid control and oversight institutions, as
well as adopting a new state aid law. To date, there is still no decree or act laying down details regarding
the conditions, criteria and / or maximum intensity of establishing regional state aid. 62
Albania - Decision on approval of the regulation "On the conditions and procedures for granting and approving
certain categories of state aid 63
At the end of 2018, Albania decided to regulate the conditions and procedures for determining the scope
and limits of state aid intensity. The maximum determined assistance depends on the coefficient of devel-
opment of the regional map. Albania has three regions at the level of NUTS II, of which no GDP per capita
exceeds 75% of the EU average, which is why regional aid is allowed throughout the country. The intensity
of regional aid should not exceed 50% of the investment, with the possibility of an additional 20% when the
aid recipient is a small enterprise or +10% in the case of medium enterprises . The amount of state aid is
also determined by the size of the investment for all investments up to 50 million euros, up to 50% for the
investment between 50 million euros and 100 million euros, and 0% for investment over 100 million euros.65
1.3.  Progress in WB countries: State aid according to the EC annual progress reports
Most WB countries have fully adopted EU state aid legislation in their national laws. However, enforcement
of these rules remains "ineffective", especially in terms of introducing an internal system of state aid con-
trol and reducing the total amount of aid relative to their GDP. 
Recommendations from EU reports on countries in the region have been widely repeated over the years,
with poor or partial readiness in the area and with moderate or no progress for the given year. Recent
reports from 2019 on progress in 2018 for all countries state that the legal framework is more or less
24
61) Uredbu o namjeni, kriterijima i uslovima za dodjelu državne pomoći u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine (Sluzbene novine Federacija
BiH, 27/2008), article 12 http://www.szdp.gov.ba/data/dokumenti/pdf/Uredba%20o%20namjeni%20i%20kriterijima%20-
%20bos.pdf
62) State Aid Guideline, Republic of Kosovo, Government, https://mf.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/B7F80FAF-32A8-4DC0-BB5A-
C959B70F4759.pdf, January 2019
63) Official Gazette of Albania 132/2018, Official Gazette of the Republic of Albania No. 132, Date 14/09/2018, On the approval of
the regulation “On the conditions and procedures for granting and authorizing certain categories of state aid”. 
64) Official Gazette of Albania, Regional State Aid Map, On the Approval of the Regional State Aid Map, Official Gazette of the Re-
public of Albania No. 131, Date 9/10/2012
Official Gazette of Albania 132/2018, Official Gazette of the Republic of Albania No. 132, Date 14/09/2018, On the approval of the
regulation “On the conditions and procedures for granting and authorizing certain categories of state aid”.
harmonized to some extent, but each of the countries is experiencing the problem of insufficient imple-
mentation of the law on state aid control, hence the possibility of granting state aid without it being no-
ticed at all by the institutions, granting state aid that should not be allowed, and insufficient awareness
among state aid providers of their duties, rules, and the need for improved transparency. For all countries
in the region there is still the need to more strongly develop state aid control and for the competent au-
thorities to perform their functions adequately and fully. The notes from the 2018 reports are given in
more detail for each country in the table below. 
Table 3: Review of Parts of the 2018 EC Reports on WB Countries Relating to State Aid Control 
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MK
Progress Report
ALB
Progress Report
BiH
Analytical Report
Report from 2019 for 2018, Chapter 08, part State aid
State aid 
The Legislative Framework for State Aid Control is still broadly aligned with Articles 107 and
108 of the TFEU and with corresponding provisions of the SAA. The Law on State Aid and the
Regulation for granting aid of minor importance (de minimis) still need to be amended. Imple-
menting the legislation on certain forms of aid and specific sectors still needs to be aligned
with the acquis. In addition, the state aid inventory and the regional aid map are outdated and
lack transparency. 
With regard to the institutional framework, the CPC is also responsible for implementing the
Law on State Aid. State aid grantors must notify the CPC of their plans to grant new or alter
existing state aid so that it can assess its compatibility. If an aid measure is not notified, the
CPC has the power to investigate it ex-officio, and can order its recovery. CPC's administrative
capacity to deal with state aid control and enforcement remains insufficient with only three
staff, outdated equipment and budget constraints. 
State aid 
The legislative framework is broadly in line with the acquis and the SAA. Amended in 2016, the
Law on State Aid largely reflects Articles 107 and 108 of TFEU. Legislation was adopted on the
conditions and procedures for granting State aid. This legislation aims to partially align Albania’s
legislation with the 2014 General Block Exemption Regulation. Further alignment with imple-
menting EU legislation on State aid control is still needed.
On institutional framework, the State Aid Commission (SAC) is responsible for implementing
the Law on State Aid. The Ministry of Finance and Economy, which is an aid granting institution,
continues to determine its organizational set-up. This means that the SAC cannot be considered
an operationally independent authority, as required by the SAA.
The enforcement capacity of the SAC’s secretariat raises serious concerns, as it is currently in-
sufficient and needs to be significantly strengthened. It has yet to be shown that the Law on
State Aid is being implemented effectively. The state aid control enforcement record is very
low.
State aid 
... the legislative framework is partially aligned with EU legislation and the provisions of the
SAA. It consists of the Law on the State Aid System in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the regu-
lations adopted by the Council of Ministers and the entities of the District Governments in
Brcko. .... In general, the relevant bylaws have not been adopted equally throughout the country.
... A regional aid map has yet to be drawn up. This aid map will show the geographical areas
identified at NUTS II level where companies have the right to receive regional state aid in de-
fined intensities in accordance with the regional guidelines for state aid.
As for the institutional framework, the State Aid Council is responsible for ensuring consistent
implementation of the Law on the State Aid System. The functioning of the State Aid Council
is significantly hampered by ethnic-based procedures.
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Serbia
Progress Report
Montenegro
Progress Report
Kosovo
Report
.... As a result, the relevant provisions in the field of state aid, even if harmonized with the leg-
islation, could potentially fail to be implemented in practice. ... The implementing capacity of
the State Aid Council is insufficient. .... This raises significant concerns about its enforcement
capacity. A significant majority of state aid measures are implemented by grant before they
are notified and approved by the State Aid Council. The harmonization of the existing state aid
schemes arising from the SAA and EU state aid rules is at a very early stage.
Bosnia and Herzegovina should ensure the transparency of all granted state aid measures....
State aid 
As regards the legislative framework, the law on State aid control broadly reflects Articles 107
and 108 of the TFEU and the relevant provisions of the SAA. However, provisions providing ex-
emption from State aid rules for companies undergoing restructuring and privatization are not
compliant with the SAA and not aligned with the acquis. Existing aid schemes, including the
fiscal State aid schemes part of the law on corporate income tax, the law on personal income
tax and the law on free zones, need to be aligned with the acquis to comply with the SAA, the
CSAC needs to step up its efforts to provide the European Commission with information on a
number of individual decisions approving large amounts of State aid to major operators in the
economy, in line with its obligation under Article 73(5) of the SAA. The regional aid map has
yet to be drafted.
... The Commission cannot be considered as operationally independent, as required by the SAA.
The enforcement capacity of the CSAC remains very weak and insufficient...There was no
progress made on implementing the law on State aid. From January 2018 to February 2019,
the CSAC took 64 decisions upon notification and another 15 decisions in ex post procedure
(illegal aid). However, the CSAC has not yet taken a single decision prohibiting state aid nor a
decision in favor of recovery...
State aid 
The legislative framework is to a large extent in line with the EU acquis and the SAA as well
as with Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU. The rules on the financing of services of general eco-
nomic interest are largely aligned with the EU State aid acquis, however Montenegro needs to
demonstrate their proper enforcement.
Amendments to the Law on the protection of competition entered into force in March 2018.
They expanded the mandate of the APC to include State aid control, in order to meet the SAA
requirement on the operational independence of the State aid authority.
As regards the institutional framework, the State Aid Control Commission (SACC) was disman-
tled in July 2018. In line with the Law on State aid control, the newly established Council of
the APC took over its responsibilities. ...The State aid authority has yet to establish a solid
track record on enforcement. The enforcement capacity of the former SACC and the current
APC Council remains significantly insufficient ... There is continued evidence that some aid
measures granted at central or local level (e.g. through VAT exemptions or debt relief), in par-
ticular to large companies, were not notified or properly investigated by the SACC/APC.
In the future, the State aid authority should also further monitor the implementation of State
aid rules in large projects undertaken in cooperation with third countries. It should thus have
access to all necessary information to provide opinions and take binding decisions. Awareness
of State aid rules among aid grantors is still insufficient and advocacy must be stepped up
considerably
State aid 
The legislative framework is largely in line with the acquis. The Law on state aid is broadly
aligned with Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU. A Regulation on Procedures and Forms of State
Aid Notification was adopted in October 2018. As regards the institutional framework, the
members of the State Aid Commission, responsible for implementing state aid control, were
appointed in March 2019. Formally, the State Aid Department in the Ministry of Finance has
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Sources:
the power to verify notified aid measures, prohibit aid, carry out ex post control of aid and re-
cover incompatible aid.
However, its capacity to enforce the law remained inadequate over much of the reporting period.
As a result, there has been no effective enforcement. The State Aid Department has not adopted
any decisions on state aid in the last five years and has been devoted to drafting secondary
legislation. The Department did not have the capacity to screen existing aid schemes and es-
tablish a comprehensive inventory of aid schemes by the SAA deadline (April 2019). Moreover,
the identification of granting authorities is still ongoing, hindering ex ante notifications and
ex post control. A number of aid measures, granted at central or local level, in particular to
large companies in various sectors (e.g. telecommunications) are not notified or properly in-
vestigated. Awareness of state aid rules among aid grantors is very weak and must be improved
significantly. 
МК: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-north-
macedonia-report.pdf, страна 64
ALB: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-albania-
report.pdf, страна 64
БиХ: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-bosnia-
and-herzegovina-analytical-report.pdf, страна 102
СР: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-re-
port.pdf, страна 65
ЦГ: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-montene-
gro-report.pdf, страна 65
КС: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-kosovo-re-
port.pdf, стана 63
2. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE REGION AND DIRECT AID POLICIES
The policies of attracting foreign investments in the WB region in the last decade have been implemented
through a significant number of programs, measures, forms, among which it is important to highlight the
appearance of the FEZ, i.e. since the enactment of the laws on free economic zones in the early 2000s,
in Montenegro in 2004, Serbia in 2006, Albania in 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2009, RN Macedonia
in 2007 and Kosovo in 2013. Since then, a significant number of free zones have been established and /
or functional: in Albania 3, in BiH 4, in RN Macedonia 15, in Kosovo 3, in Montenegro 1, in Serbia 14. 
Support is provided through fiscal and non-fiscal incentives reflected in financial but also economic costs
and benefits. The level of transparency and capacity to implement laws in the region, seen in the notes
of the EU reports, also indicates the high probability that the amount of state aid is higher than the one
recorded, but also to some extent contrary to the rules for granting state aid in terms of competition
protection. In its research on the costs and benefits of foreign investment in the free zones, CEA clearly
identifies the problem of non-transparency and lack of accountability that leaves a veil of secrecy and in-
ability to clearly assess the benefits of granted aid and the extent to which these policies’ goals are
achieved, i.e. the efficiency in spending public funds or "...the price for political and economic instability
and non-transparency is compensated by direct outflows from the budgets of those countries and by the
relatively low prices for labor and tax exemptions".66
2.1. Foreign direct investment in the WB region 
GDP per capita in the countries of the WB compared to the average GDP per capita in the EU indicates
significant differences. Expressed as a ratio, Montenegro ranks highest in the region with GDP per capita
at 25% compared to the same indicator at the EU average, with Kosovo at only 12%, and the convergence
toward the EU average is evidently slow. 
The inflow of FDI in the Western Balkans region over the past decades has seen different trends at differ-
ent times, but also differences by countries. In the second half of the 1990s, all countries in the region
saw a poor inflow of FDI over GDP. From 2000 until the financial crisis in 2008, all countries in the region
note a significant increase in FDI, following which it decreases in some of the countries. After this period,
the rates stabilize, but with a trend of stable average growth. In the period 2008-2010, Montenegro had
significantly higher rates than the average FDI inflows in the region, which reached the levels of several
tens of percent of the GDP (in 2009, 36.7%). The same is observed in Albania where FDI in relation to the
GDP continuously has a value of ~8% to ~10% per year. RN Macedonia, which has a significant number
of benefits / incentives to attract foreign investments (at least in terms of the number of benefits intro-
duced since 2007), recorded a higher share of FDI in the period 2007-2008, after which the rate stabilized
at around 2% to 3% of the GDP. In the same period in Serbia (which also offers significant benefits) there
is on average at least twice the annual share of FDI. 
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66) Center for Economic Analyses (CEA), 2016, “Benefits and Costs from Foreign Direct Investments in the Technological Industrial
Development Zones in the period of 2007–2014”, Skopje. http://cea.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/1.-Benefits-and-
costs-from-FDI-in-TIDZ-ENG.pdf.
Graph 1: GDP per capita in the WB countries relative to the EU 
Source: Data from World Bank data.
On average, the FDI (as a percentage of the GDP) per year in the last decade (2010-2018) for each of the
countries was: 3% in RN Macedonia, 8.4% in Albania, 6% in Serbia, 12.3% in Montenegro, and 2.3% in BiH. 
Table 4: Foreign direct investment in WB countries as % of GDP 
Source: UNCDAT database.
Graph 2: FDI in the region as % of GDP 
Source: UNCDAT database.
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Graph 3: FDI per capita in the WB countries 
Source: Data from World Bank data.
2.2. State aid in the region 
The data on the value of the state aid directly intended for FDI and / or in the free zones do not exist,
i.e. they cannot be separated from the available data from the information of the competent bodies.
Namely, as an illustration, RN Macedonia has lacked full transparency on this issue since the introduction
of the law on state aid control, although it is harmonized to some extent with the EU acquis. Until 2017,
the value of state aid to foreign companies was considered "confidential" and classified data. In its study
of FDI costs and benefits and as early as 2016, the CEA clearly indicated the need for data opening and
transparency of full state aid following EU recommendations in order to analyze, but also make informed
decisions.67 With the decision for declassification of these data at the 35th session of the Government
(29.08.2017) in 2018, the CPC report published for the first time the total value (cumulative) of assistance
provided to foreign companies, i.e. the total per provider with a list of users (but not an individual value
per user).
Therefore, we will provide an overview of the amount of state aid in countries to the extent that it is
available, presented as % of the GDP for comparability. This value is the granted state aid expressed as
a percentage of the GDP of the countries in the region with available data, not including the value of the
granted state aid in agriculture and traffic (or other relevant sectors) for comparability.68 The data are
based on published reports by the national body responsible for state aid control in each of the WB coun-
tries. However, considering the remarks in the EU reports on the countries concerning the level of imple-
mentation of the regulation, the volume of state aid is probably even higher.69
If we analyze the trends of the countries in the region, the state aid in the last decade (2008-2018)
ranges from 1.3% with a decrease to 0.7%, while in the same period at the average level of EU-28, the
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67) Ibid.
68) Of all the countries in the region, only RN Macedonia through its competent body does not report over subsidies in agriculture
as part of the state aid reports. The agriculture subsidies are also fully exempt from the law. Other countries in the region for
which reports are available separately report on state aid in agriculture, as do EU member states through various parameters
and in the absolute and relative ratio of the Scoreboard database. 
69) The inefficiency of the implementation of the policies for control of the state aid in parallel as in Macedonia with the findings of
the SAO for state aid providers. See more in the audit reports for INVESTINMACEDONIA, DTIZ, etc. 
relative value of state aid ranges from 0.5% to 0.7%. If we analyze each country separately, the high rel-
ative annual indicators above 1% of the national GDP stand out, especially in Serbia (average for 2008-
2018, 1.5%) and Montenegro (average for 2008-2018, 1.2%), which has a relative index several times
higher than the EU average, while in RN Macedonia, the index is significantly lower (average for 2008-
2018, 0.2%). The trend of convergence, or reduction of the relative indicators toward the EU average, is
visible in the countries, especially as of 2014.
Graph 4: Awarded state aid  
Source: State Aid Scoreboard for EU,70 annual reports for all separate years of national state aid control bodies for WB
countries.
Table 5: State aid as % of GDP
*SA without agriculture and traffic, Montenegro, BiH and Serbia report them together and separately, RN Macedonia does not report
on state aid in agriculture in the reports of the competent bodies.
**2016 for MK allowed not granted.
Source: State Aid Scoreboard for EU,71 annual reports for all separate years of national state aid control bodies for WB
countries.
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70) State Aid Scoreboard 2018: Results, trends and observations regarding EU28 State Aid expenditure reports for 2017,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/state_aid_scoreboard_2018.pdf
71) State Aid Scoreboard 2018: Results, trends and observations regarding EU28 State Aid expenditure reports for 2017,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/state_aid_scoreboard_2018.pdf
Graph 5: State aid per capita
Source: Data based on years of reports from national bodies, population and investments from World Bank data.
2.3. Regional competition for FDI through fiscal and non-fiscal measures 
According to the economic literature, regional competition for attracting investment through a series of
incentives can have a significant negative impact on economies if it leads to:
1) deadweight loss - i.e. approving and awarding incentives to investors who would invest anyway,
resulting in unnecessary costs; or 
2) beggar-thy-neighbor, i.e. when countries try to outdo each other in terms of incentives in order
to attract investors.
The OECD (2013) Checklist for FDI Incentive Policies72 (short excerpts) states the following on their useful-
ness: ... the most effective policies for attracting FDI are those that improve the general economic and
business environment of a country, rather than those aimed at tax breaks, financial subsidies and regu-
latory exceptions aimed at foreign enterprises and some investors above others. ...OECD recognizes that
incentives can help in efficient FDI allocation, but that they can also distort competition, which can rep-
resent a high cost both for the international community and in the long term for the host country as
well…Therefore, the OECD guide cites FDI incentives that are available to policy makers, both positive
and negative. Here are five key pointers that make FDI incentives wasteful:
l Ineffectiveness - the usage of FDI incentives fails to produce benefits to the host economy that exceeds
the budgetary costs. This situation may arise where authorities apply faulty cost-benefit analysis or
no cost-benefit analysis at all, to their incentive;
l Inefficiency - here incentives produce benefits that outweigh the cost, but authorities fail to properly
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs;
l Opportunity Costs - when the resources available to attract FDI are scarce, the issue of alternative
usage of funds arises;
l Deadweight loss - subsidizing investment projects that would have taken place in the absence of in-
centives; inadequately targeting the intended recipients that has only resulted in spillover to non-
target groups; authorities, in order to maintain a reasonably level playing field in their domestic
business sector, feel obliged to match FDI incentives by offsetting subsidies to other enterprises; au-
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72) OECD (2003), Checklist for Foreign Direct Investment Incentive Policies, https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-pol-
icy/2506900.pdf
thorities, by offering particularly generous FDI incentives to some projects, effectively “raise the bar”,
creating a reference point that future investors will use to expect the same or better subsidies;
l Triggering competition - when long-term costs of an incentive scheme include the economic burden
that arises if other jurisdictions put in place matching measures.
The incentives, subsidies, and state aid through fiscal and non-fiscal measures offered by the countries
in the region are significant, and as they are listed in the table below (the list may not be exhaustive due
to frequent regulatory changes, policy changes and measures), may already indicate the possible effects
of the aforementioned potential negative implications, i.e. that countries in the region are in competition
with what country will "give" more. Moreover, this may be an indication of possible inefficiencies and in-
effectiveness (in the absence of clear expectations that would be compared) as well as the generation of
unnecessary / permanently lost assets. On the other hand, of course, there are expected benefits. 
Table 6: Overview of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for investment in economic zones 
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Overview of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for investments in economic zones and in general for investments in
the countries of the Western Balkans 
Country Fiscal and tax incentives Other non-fiscal / non-tax incentives 
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
• Albanian products entering technical and economic development
zones exempt from VAT and customs duties (0% in zones, 
standard VAT rate 20%)
• Capital expenditures are deducted up to 120% 
• Customers additionally exempt from 50% of tax on profit 
(at 7.5% as opposed to the standard rate of 15%) for 5 years
• Exempted from property taxes
• Wages and social contributions are recognized costs up to 150%
for the first year
• Training costs are doubled over a period of 10 years
• Research and development costs are doubled (200%) in 10 years
• Income tax in economic zones 0% (standard rates depend on the
level of personal income and are taxed at 0%, 13% and 23%)
• Free zone users do not pay VAT and customs duties on 
equipment (standard VAT rate 17%)
• Reduction of profit tax (30-50% of profit tax) or tax exemptions
based on job creation (exemptions) in both entities: FBiH, profit
tax reduced to 7% if 50% of profit is reinvested, to 5% if the 
investment is >10 mil euros, 200% recognized gross wage costs
for new employment; while in RS the investment is tax exempt
as well as income tax and contributions if more than 30 
employees are employed (standard profit tax rate 10%, personal
income tax 10%)
• Exemption from excise duties on goods intended for export
• Release or reduction of property taxes (standard rates in RS
0.2%, in FBiH different in different cantons)
• For all investors - 1 € long-term lease
of land and buildings for 99 years
• Priority / fast procedures and services
from state institutions
• Infrastructure in the zones (water,
electricity, sewerage, etc.)
• Promotion through the promotion
agency
• Infrastructure in the zones 
(water, electricity, sewerage, etc.)
• Grants for international promotion for
both foreign and domestic companies
Source for: 
Serbia http://www.usz.gov.rs/pogodnosti.php
Macedonia http://fez.gov.mk/why-invest/#1516709706334-5b5d1d63-4d2e
Bosnia and Herzegovina  http://www.fipa.gov.ba/informacije/povlastice/strani_investitori/default.aspx?id=141&langTag=en-US
Montenegro http://www.mek.gov.me/program_za_unapredjenje/podsticaj_investicija/
Albania https://invest-in-albania.org/investment-tips-2/investment-incentives-in-albania/
Kosovo https://kiesa.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/A4BBAEFE-05E8-4768-A7B2-BA36E4A1B9A8.pdf
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• FEZ - tax holiday - investors in economic zones are entitled to a
10-year profit tax exemption (standard 10% profit tax rate)
• The zones offer a 100% reduction in personal income tax for 10
years - effective rate 0% (standard 10% personal income tax
rate)
• Investors are exempt from paying VAT on goods, raw materials
and equipment in the zones (standard rate 18%)
• Exemption from customs duties on goods, raw materials, equip-
ment and machinery (standard rates 5-20%)
• Investors are exempt from paying local utility fees or construc-
tion permit fees (standard property tax rates 0.1-0.2%, property
transfer tax 3%)
• 0% customs duties and 0% VAT (standard rate 20%, preferential
10%)
• 0% profit tax in and out of investment zones >8 mil euros and
>100 employees for up to 10 years (standard rate of profit tax
15%)
• Investors are exempt from paying local property taxes or have
reduced rates (standard property tax rates 0.6-1%, property
transfer tax 3%), in certain zones and other local taxes such as
utilities and fees are exempt or reduced
• 0% import duties 
• Deferred payment of VAT on equipment for the facility in FEZ
• 0% customs duties and 0% VAT on goods entering the zone
(standard VAT rate 19%)
• Reduction of 40% to 70% on all local duties as building permits
in the free zone (Bar)
• State-sponsored incentives for investors such as job creation
grants, as well as exemption from paying social security contri-
butions and personal income tax for employment of special
groups applicable to all investments (standard income tax rate
9% and 11% with additional exemptions for employment)
• Reduced profit tax rates from 0% for a period of up to 3 years in
underdeveloped profit areas up to 20 thousand euros, applies to
all (standard profit tax rate 9%)
• Long-term lease of land in the zones
for a period of up to 99 years
• Up to 0.5 mil euros cash grant for the
cost of construction of facilities, de-
pending on the number of new jobs
and the amount of the investment
• Exemption from customs duties on
equipment and spare parts used for
the zone
• Infrastructure (water supply, sewerage,
etc.)
• Preferential / fast / priority services
from the state: approvals for design
and infrastructure, issuance of build-
ing and operation permits, customs
administration, contacts with other
state and local authorities and the like
• Equalization of assistance to domestic
and foreign investors
• One-stop-shop system for administra-
tion services
• Simple and fast customs procedures
(each zone has a customs office)
• Local subsidies for using infrastructure
of the free zone
• Services under preferential conditions
for the zones (transport, banking serv-
ices, etc.)
• Exemption from local duties 
• Providing infrastructure (electricity,
gas, water, sewerage) and preferential
land costs
2.4. Decisive motives for investing
In 2018, the World Bank, as part of the Global Investment Competitiveness Report, published a detailed
report on the motives and reasons of foreign investors in deciding where to invest.73 Investors consider
a wide range of factors, the most important one being the existence of political stability and security, as
well as the business-legal and regulatory environment. These are the primary factors that rank according
to importance before other factors such as infrastructure, qualifications, talent, and skills of the workforce
as well as low labor costs and inputs. For 86% of multinational investors, the regulatory environment
and laws are an important or critically important factor that indicates the weight of this deciding factor
in making an investment decision. Significantly lower on the list of priorities, but still important, are low
taxes and cheap labor, real estate access and access to finance. 
Regarding the level of critical importance of incentive measures, which are used and present in both
high-income countries and developing countries, investors rank them in fourth place out of six charac-
teristics for the business investment environment. The incentives are ranked after the priorities for: trans-
parency and predictability in the behavior of government and public agencies, the existence of guarantees
for protection of investments with laws, and simplicity in founding and establishing business activity.
Overall, only one in five investors believes that the absence of investment incentives is a decisive factor
in investing, while one third believes that incentives are important, but not decisive. 
This suggests that incentives cannot be fully eliminated, but on their own, they are unlikely to persuade
investors to choose a given location / country for their investment. Hence, the basic recommendation for
policies and policy makers is that the investment climate must first be addressed before resorting to in-
centives as a means of attracting investors. 
As such, given that the WB region faces unpredictable political crises and instability, a low level of rule
of law, an unpredictable regulatory environment, etc., we note that these are significant factors that have
had a large share in the volatile and relatively low level of past foreign investments. At the same time,
the success of investments to a certain extent in each of the countries has not been realized as a result
of incentives as a key deciding factor, pointing to the effect of deadweight losses and inefficient public
spending. According to the above, despite the improvement of the business climate and the progress of
the past decade, the priority of the countries should be to create an environment for political stability,
predictability, and legal certainty. 
2.5. Regional Strategic Platforms for Economic Cooperation in WB: Protection of competition 
and state aid control 
The need for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans has been acknowledged as necessary given the
European aspirations of all countries in the region, as the EU values countries not only separately but
also as a "package". This approach is also seen through neighborhood policies, the enlargement strategy
for the Western Balkans,74 as well as group progress reports for the region75 and enlargement policies.
Regional cooperation is seen from the perspective of multiple dimensions, the political, security and eco-
nomic one. From an economic point of view, as development is a priority for all WB countries, due to their
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73) World Bank. 2018. Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018: Foreign Investor Perspectives and Policy Implications.
Washington, DC: World Bank. doi: 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-1175-3. 
74) A credible enlargement perspective for an enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, COM(2018) 65 final,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-
balkans_en.pdf, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-communication-on-eu-enlarge-
ment-policy_en.pdf
75) https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-communication-on-eu-enlargement-policy_en.pdf
size and fragmented economic space, intensive regional cooperation is a chance for economic progress.
Achievements in the past have been marked by the liberalization of trade as one aspect of all SAAs. From
regional summits in recent years, this policy of the EU toward the countries of the Western Balkans, as
well as SEE, has resulted in the RCC (Regional Cooperation Council), which leads the key strategic plat-
forms that have emerged from there in the past. They clearly identify the need for cooperation in the
field of investment, as well as the need for improved policies to protect competition. Key strategic doc-
uments adopted by the countries in the region are:
l The SEE 2020 Strategy (South East Europe 2020 Strategy), inspired by the Europe 2020 Strategy, fo-
cuses on regional cooperation through a common approach to the EU.76 The document clearly identifies
the protection of competition and state aid control as being among the key pillars of the advanced
competitiveness of the regional economy:
u ”[Strengthening competitive economic environment in the region is of key importance to support free flow of
goods and services as well as to level the playing field in facilitating FDI inflows. The main issues to be addressed
in the Integrated Growth agenda are trade related aspects of the competition rules, intellectual property rights
and public procurement. Hence, these are the areas where an accelerated alignment with the EU acquis and in-
ternational rules would have a direct positive impact on both promotion of regional trade and investment] 77
u In Pillar 3 Sustainable Development, one of the main direct measures and activities for Chapter 8
is to promote cooperation in the area of competition policy by […establishing a network of competition
authorities and a coordination body; developing regional guidelines on the State aid transparency; developing
a common methodology for peer reviewing),] ... but also indirectly related to this chapter through meas-
ures for regional market liberalization and trade, promotion of transparency, anti-corruption, full open-
ness of regional competition in the field of public procurement, regional promotion of the energy
sector, coordination of common tax policies, etc. 
u Progress: In terms of state aid from the strategy in the annual progress report for implementation
in 2019, prepared by the RCC, relatively insufficient progress was made in relation to the planned goal
for 2020: .. [There is clear evidence that private investments have led to higher economic growth, but in-
vestments are needed in tradable sectors to sustain growth. The investment climate has remained largely
unchanged and is characterized by weak rule of law, lack of proper implementation of state aid control, a
strengthened gray economy, poor access to finance and low levels of regional integration and connectivity.78]79
The initiative for a joint CEFTA Competition and State Aid Committee was discussed at the CEFTA
meeting in 2018, which is in line with the CEFTA Agreement and the MAP REA (Multi-annual Action
Plan for Regional Economic Area).80 [In the area of Competitive Economic Environment a deeper cooper-
ation should be undertaken on topics of competition, state aid and public procurement. ERPs of the region
pointed out a strong sense of unfair competition primarily fueled by large and inefficient state-owned enter-
prises, the large informal economy and the large state aid schemes for FDIs....]81
36
76) South East Europe 2020 Strategy, https://www.rcc.int/pages/86/south-east-europe-2020-strategy
77) Ibid. page 17
78) 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 2019 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-communication-on-eu-enlargement-policy_en.pdf 
79) South East Europe 2020: 2019 Annual report on implementation, https://www.rcc.int/docs/479/south-east-europe-2020-2019-
annual-report-on-implementation-rn 
80) As of May 2020, we have not found publicly available information on the official establishment of such a body.
81) South East Europe 2020: 2019 Annual report on implementation, https://www.rcc.int/docs/479/south-east-europe-2020-2019-
annual-report-on-implementation-rn
u The main recommendation in the area is [B. Competitive economic environment: (i) Implement com-
petition policies and cooperate by exchanging best practices and information between competition
and state aid authorities in view of attracting investment and creating a trade defense measures free
region, and (ii) introduce measures to improve the level of regional harmonization rather than fostering
a race to the bottom and eliminate remaining discriminatory practices in public procurement mar-
kets.]82
l At the Western Balkans Summit in Trieste in 2017, the Western Balkan countries accepted / adopted
the MAP REA83 - Multi-annual Action Plan for Regional Economic Area of the Western Balkans, which
clearly identifies and clarifies the key pillars of cooperation in the next period, coordinated by the RCC
and supported by the EC, which is in line with the SEE 2020 Strategy. In the latest progress report of
MAP REA from 201984 (prepared by the RCC with the Secretariat of CEFTA), in the part of policies
aimed at 1.3. Creating a region free of (non-tariff measures) NTM and (trade defense measures) TDM,
the assessment of implementation in the area of cooperation is a 3.3 on a scale of 1 to 5.85
l The Regional Investment Reform Agency (RIRA) was approved by the representatives of the six
economies of the Western Balkans at a ministerial meeting of the Investment Committee of Southeast
Europe held in Tivat in 2018. RIRA's goal is to further harmonize investment policies with European
Union (EU) standards and international best practices, within the framework of the SEE 2020 Strategy,
the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the EU's pre-accession and accession
processes. In the framework of Attracting and Promoting Investment policies, the reform area Stream-
lining incentives, and improving their transparency and governance indicates the need to implement
incentive standards and principles related to transparency, governance and predictability in accordance
with the obligations stemming from the EU pre-accession process (chapter on competition and state
aid), further access to information on incentives for investments, peer-to-peer learning of methodolo-
gies for cost-benefit evaluation, and experiences with the monitoring and evaluation of incentives to
assess the effectiveness and cost-benefit considerations at the economy level.86
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82) Ibid, page 33
83) Multi-Annual Action Plan for Regional Economic Area in the Western Balkan Six, 
https://www.rcc.int/docs/383/consolidated-multi-annual-action-plan-for-a-regional-economic-area-in-the-western-balkans-six
84) Извештај 2019 https://www.rcc.int/priority_areas/39/map-rea
85) For more see the full report for 2018 and 2019 https://www.rcc.int/priority_areas/39/map-rea  
86) See more https://www.rcc.int/docs/ 410 / regional-investment-reform-agenda-for-the-western-balkans-six  
3. THE IMPACT OF STATE AID ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS 
In this part of the study, we focus on state aid policies in the countries of the region and their relevance
in terms of attracting foreign direct investment - which is considered one of their main goals. Typically,
countries that are formerly planned economies in the transition phase to market economies use different
forms of taxation and other alleviation to attract foreign companies in order to acquire foreign capital.87
The purpose of this quantitative analysis is to assess the relevance of these policies at the regional level
measured by the growth of foreign direct investment in the region - which is used as the main argument
in support of state aid for foreign companies.
The issue of state aid in the Western Balkans region was a subject of analysis at the Center for Economic
Analyses in the past.88 According to a 2014 study by the Center for Economic Analyses (CEA), parliaments
in the Western Balkans are responsible for overseeing state aid policies, but focus more on the formal
aspects of annual reports from the audit institutions of state aid, rather than the essence of oversight,
without paying due attention to the efficiency and effectiveness of these policies in attracting foreign di-
rect investment without compromising market competition. Hence, the main motive for this part of the
analysis arises - in the absence of effective oversight and evaluation of state aid policies, we believe that
it is up to the civil society not only to initiate the discussion, but also to contribute with concrete findings
and recommendations in the field of state aid control. Otherwise, there is a danger that countries will
make discretionary, non-transparent and harmful decisions on granting state aid when attracting foreign
direct investment, instead of implementing them as part of socio-economic policies for better functioning
of national economies.
Our analysis will include an overview of relevant indicators for countries related to state aid and will sta-
tistically assess the relationship between the level of granted state aid and the level of foreign direct in-
vestment, as well as the growth rate of gross domestic product and foreign direct investment. In the first
part of this analysis, we refer to a review of the literature related to the policies for state aid in the region
and their relationship with foreign direct investment as well as other determinants of foreign direct in-
vestment in the region. The second part focuses on data analysis that is key to this part of the analysis,
i.e. the amount of foreign direct investment for each of the countries, economic growth rate, corporate
tax rates, unemployment rate of the highly educated population, average net level wages, the global com-
petitiveness index, the level of openness of the economy and the volume of exports. In the third part, we
establish the degree of correlation and causality among the selected variables and present the results of
the econometric analysis.
Review of literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment in the countries of the region and
their relationship with state aid
State aid control is a specific and unique concept for the European Union in order to protect the internal
European common market and, as such, is not found under other legislation - for example, at the federal
level in the United States there are no provisions to limit subsidies within individual states.89 Since Eu-
ropean national economies and markets are not as homogeneous as those in the United States, supra-
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87) Nikolov, M. & Stojanovic, S. (2017), ‘Corporate Tax Incentives in Transitory Economies: Case of the Republic of Serbia and Repub-
lic of Macedonia’, MEST Journal
88) Nikolov, M., Cuculoska, S. & Garvanlieva, V. (2014), ‘Parliamentary Oversight of Competitiveness Policies, State Aid and Attract-
ing Foreign Direct Investment in the Western Balkans’, p. 43
89) Philipsen, N. J. (2016), ‘From Market Integration to Fiscal Discipline: Analysing the Goals of EU State Aid Policy from an Eco-
nomic Perspective’, SSRN Electronic Journal
national state aid control is more than necessary from a public interest perspective. According to Philipsen,
in order to avoid competition in the domestic market, government subsidies are justified only when it is
an attempt to correct market deficiencies or when it is done in order to achieve certain social goals or
environmental measures.90 According to Article 88 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, the European Commission has a duty to control state aid. Among other things, state aid measures
must meet the criterion that they, as such, are an economic advantage for the recipient, which would not
result in normal market conditions. This means that state aid has the potential to affect competition and
trade among member states.91
Although the European Union imposes a certain limit on Western Balkan countries on the amount of ap-
proved state aid, the Union is not so restrictive as to the forms of state aid, which puts them in a favorable
position vis-a-vis member states in attracting foreign direct investments, at least in the short term.92
However, the question remains of what is the effect of state aid on attracting foreign direct investment,
and how much of it is due to other factors such as physical and social capital, the development of which
is closely linked to public spending, and which on the other hand may be eroded as a result of irresponsible
state aid schemes. Other competitive advantages that characterize this region are its geographical prox-
imity to the large European market, free trade agreements with the European Union and other major
economies such as Russia and Turkey, low tax rates and cheap labor.93
Whether the spending of state money by subsidizing foreign companies is beneficial to the economy de-
pends on how the presence of these companies affects the economy. According to Bhandari et al.94 in a
study analyzing the period from 1993 to 2002 for several Eastern European countries, the results show
that the inflow of foreign direct investment has a positive effect on economic growth in these countries.
Atoyan & Jankulov (2015),95 using micro data for four Balkan countries - Bosnia and Herzegovina, North
Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia - as well as for Bulgaria, Poland and Romania for the period 2006 to 2013,
also show that if inflows of foreign direct investments per capita increase by ten percent, unemployment
falls by two to three percent, which then has a positive effect on economic growth. 
On the other hand, Mencinger (2003)96 analyzed the relationship between foreign direct investments and
economic growth in eight countries during their transition phase (Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Latvia) from 1994 to 2001, showing the inverse-proportional rela-
tionship between foreign direct investments and economic growth, and explaining this phenomenon with
the appearance of less favorable forms of foreign direct investment such as the taking over of domestic
companies by large foreign companies and smaller domestic companies giving in to the pressure of foreign
competition. 
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90) Ibid.
91) Nikolov, M., Cuculoska, K. & Garvanlieva, V. (2014) “Parliamentary Oversight - over Policies of Competition, State Aid and attract-
ing Foreigh Direct Investments in the Countries of the Western Balkans”, Center for Economic Analyses (CEA)
92) OECD (2017), ‘Tracking Special Economic Zones in the Western Balkans: Objectives, Features and Key Challenges’, Global Rela-
tions – South East Europe, accessible in 2020 at http://www.oecd.org/south-east-europe/SEZ_WB_2017.pdf
93) Ibid.
94) Bhandari, Rabindra, Dharmendra Dhakal, Gyan Pradhan, and Kamal Upadhyaya, (2007) "Foreign Aid, FDI and Economic Growth in
Eastern European Countries." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 13 pp. 1-9
95) Atoyan, R. and Jankulov, I., 2015, “Western Balkans: the Quest for Jobs”, in Regional Economic Issues, April 2015: Europe: The
Western Balkans: 15 Years of Economic Transition, Washington DC
96) Mencinger, Ј. (2003), ‘Does Foreign Direct Investments Always Enhance Economic Growth?, KYKLOS, Vol. 56 – 2003 – Fasc. 4,
491–508
In addition to achieving the goal of attracting foreign direct investments, states are at risk of increasing
public spending on state aid, and of reducing public revenue by often lowering tax rates in order to in-
crease attractiveness as a destination for foreign capital. The danger of the so-called "race to the bottom"
typically arises when states offer large tax breaks to attract more foreign companies than neighboring
countries, resulting with erosion of public revenues in each country individually and in the region as a
whole. This phenomenon is particularly present if at the same time foreign direct investments do not
contribute to an adequate increase in economic growth in the countries. In this race to the bottom, some-
times the opportunity costs are high in the sense that tax breaks and state aid are provided to FDI that
would come anyway to the countries that provide those benefits and that assistance. For example, the
analysis of the Center for Economic Analyses from 201697 estimates that the opportunity cost for North
Macedonia could be up to 36 million euros from lost taxes due to state aid granted to FDI that would
have come anyway without state aid. 
A study of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic shows that state aid policies introduced in those
countries in the early 1990s, which cover 10-year tax breaks, have proven effective in attracting foreign
direct investments.98 However, the study points out that state aid in these countries was successful for
the period under analysis because it was followed by job creation in the manufacturing and construction
industries, especially in less developed regions, with no restrictions on ownership (residents and non-res-
idents) and was made in a completely transparent manner so as not to disrupt market competition.
If countries reduce taxes in order to attract foreign direct investment, and therefore public revenues and
public expenditures, or increase public debt, while foreign companies do not contribute to economic
growth, this policy would have a negative effect on the whole economy. A study measuring tax elasticity
in terms of inflows of foreign direct investments in Eastern European countries for the period 1990 to
2002 shows that changes in tax rates do not contribute to higher inflows of foreign direct investments.
Additionally, according to Nikolov (2017), in order to achieve the goal of attracting foreign investments,
it is necessary to abandon narrow fiscal measures such as tax breaks for foreign companies and focus on
building political and economic stability as well as civil society and quality social infrastructure.99 Such
stability implies rule of law, building trust in institutions, and controlling corruption. 
In the analysis of the Center for Economic Analyses from 2016,100 which assesses the costs and benefits of
foreign direct investment in Macedonia, the main recommendation is to change the FDI attraction, which
should be improved in order to maintain existing investments by creating a second generation of structural
reforms that will involve sustainable working conditions, mostly toward stabilizing the political environment,
creating a predictable business climate, reducing perceptions of corruption, and so on. In the region, how-
ever, governments mostly base FDI attraction on narrow measures that include pricing criteria (fiscal, labor
cost, direct assistance for lower capital costs, and other). Governments in those same countries as Serbia
and Macedonia seem to be competing over who will pay more to foreign investors to come to the country.
Of course, the price for political and economic instability and non-transparency is offset by direct outflows
from those countries' budgets and relatively low labor costs and tax exemptions.101
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97) Center for Economic Analyses (CEA), 2016, “Benefits and Costs from Foreign Direct Investments in the Technological Industrial
Development Zones in the period of 2007–2014”
98) Sedmihradsky, M. & Klazar, S. (2002), ‘Tax Competititon For FDI in Central-European Countries’, CESifo Working Paper No. 647 (1)
99) Nikolov, M. (2017), ‘Opportunity cost of PT (Profit tax) to other taxes regarding the audit: Are the tax holidays in Macedonia worth
the cost?’, Fiscal Reform Project
100) Center for Economic Analyses (CEA), 2016, “Benefits and Costs from Foreign Direct Investments in the Technological Industrial
Development Zones in the period of 2007–2014”
101) Ibid.
The functioning of the market economy is closely related to healthy market competition and therefore it
is expected that foreign companies will seek foreign markets that operate under fair market conditions.
A study investigating the relationship between market competition and the inflow of foreign direct in-
vestment for 60 countries for the period 2007-2017 proves that there is a statistically significant and
positive relationship between these two phenomena.102 However, when it comes to a small economy, the
results of the study indicate that the positive impact on the level of market competition is declining, and
countries must make up for it by expecting further progress in the functioning of state institutions, the
financial system, economic development, development of the internal market, etc. In addition, a study of
EU member states analyzing the period from 2003 to 2006 empirically shows that a crucial factor for
foreign companies expanding into the markets of South Europe member states is for countries to have
an efficient government in addition to other important factors such as economic performance, business
climate and infrastructure - concluding that the role of governments is much more pronounced in building
healthy competition in the markets of southern Europe and is a crucial factor in foreign companies making
decisions to expand their business.103
Political and economic stability is a key factor in the inflow of foreign direct investments. A study analyzing
52 countries for the period from 1985 to 2000 shows that bureaucracy, corruption, the banking sector
and the legal system are important determinants of foreign direct investments.104 These factors are so
important that a change in these factors from lower to higher levels of institutional quality has an impact
on the inflow of foreign direct investment as if the country is a neighboring country with the country of
parent foreign companies. 
The review of the literature shows that state aid and low tax rates or tax exemptions as measures to at-
tract foreign direct investment that positively affect the economic growth of countries are effective if
they are accompanied by the existence of quality institutions in functioning market economies, whose
markets are characterized by fair market conditions and are granted in a transparent manner under pre-
viously determined requirements that solve certain market imperfections or encourage the achievement
of a certain social goal in the host country.
Analysis of indicators for attracting foreign direct investments in the countries of the region
The following is an analysis of indicators important for explaining the trends of state aid and foreign
direct investments in the countries of the region for 2017 as the last year105 for which we have comparative
data, for each of the countries and for each of the indicators, as follows:
1) Amount of foreign direct investment in absolute amount and as a percentage of gross domestic product;
2) Amount of granted state aid in absolute amount and as a percentage of gross domestic product;
3) Economic growth rate;
4) Corporate tax rate;
5) Average monthly net salary and percentage of unemployed with higher education;
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102) Velickovski, I. & Petreski, M. (2019), 'Size, competitiveness and FDIs: Small or transition country curse?’, Small States & Territo-
ries, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2019, pp. 23-40.
103) Anastassoupulos, G. (2007), 'Countries' International Competitiveness and FDI: an Empirical Analysis of Selected EU Member
Countries and Regions', Journal of Economics and Business Vol. X - 2007, N° 1 (35-52)
104) Bénassy-Quéré, A., Coupet, M. & Mayer, T. (2007), 'Institutional Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment', The World Econ-
omy, doi: 10.1111 / j.1467-9701.2007.01022.
105) With certain exceptions for individual countries and indicators for which a period of one year is taken before and after 2016
due to the unavailability of data, i.e. for Macedonia the data are taken for 2018, which is the first year in which the Commission
for the Protection of Competition and state aid control announced a transparent amount of state aid, and for Montenegro data
are taken for 2016 as those are the last publicly available data on the amount of state aid in the country.
6) Global Competitiveness Index and Trade Openness Index;
7) Export in absolute amount and as a percentage of gross domestic product;
The analysis covers the following countries: North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montene-
gro, Croatia and Slovenia. Albania and Kosovo are not part of the sample due to a lack of publicly available
data. The presentation below shows Serbia holds the largest amount of foreign direct investments in ab-
solute terms in the region and Montenegro the lowest. On the other hand, foreign direct investment is
the least involved in gross domestic product in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the most again in Serbia. 
From the descriptive analysis of the data in Graph 6 we can see that Serbia has the highest amount of
state aid in both absolute and relative terms (as % of the GDP). It is interesting to note from the visual
presentation of Graph 6 and Graph 7 that the level of state aid granted to countries corresponds to the
level of foreign direct investments in absolute terms.
Graph 6: Foreign direct investments in the Western Balkans
Source: Data from the World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/. 
Graph 7: Regional state aid in the Western Balkans 
Source: Data from the annual reports of the competent authorities on state aid control in the countries and from
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html.
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In the following graph, we can compare the economic growth rate with foreign direct investments as a
percentage of gross domestic product. The data show that Slovenia has the highest economic growth,
with the lowest percentage of foreign direct investments in gross domestic product, while Serbia has the
lowest economic growth and the highest percentage of foreign direct investment in gross domestic prod-
uct.
Graph 8: Foreign direct investment as % of GDP and economic growth in the Western Balkans
Source: Data from the World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/.
The data in Graph 9 indicate that, contrary to expectations, the three countries with higher corporate tax
rates (Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia) have higher inflows of foreign direct investment, while countries with
lower corporate tax rates (profit tax) (Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro) have lower
inflows of foreign direct investment.
Graph 9: Foreign direct investments and fiscal rates in the Western Balkans
Source: Data from the World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/ and https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/. 
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Graph 10: Net monthly salaries and unemployment of educated personnel in the Western Balkans
Source: Data from the World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/ and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_European_coun-
tries_by_average_wage#Net_average_monthly_salary_(2017).
From the net wage display, we note that Serbia, as the country with the highest absolute amount of
foreign direct investment, has the lowest average monthly net salary in the region. The attached data
show that the region is characterized by high unemployment of the highly educated population, with the
highest rate in Macedonia at 17.82%, and the lowest in Slovenia at 5.21%. The combination of cheap labor
and a high percentage of the unemployed with higher education makes the region attractive to foreign
companies.
Graph 11: Indices of Global Competitiveness and Trade Openness in the Western Balkans
Source: Data from http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2016-2017/competitiveness-rankings/
and  https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/trade_openness/.
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Graph 12: Exports from the Western Balkan countries
Source: Data from the World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/.
Во однос на индексот на глобална конкурентност и трговска отвореност, Словенија е земјата од ре-
гионот која има највисоки вредности на овие индикатори. Дополнително, Словенија бележи највисока
вредност на извозот во апсолутна вредност и како процент од бруто домашниот производ. Од анали-
зата на приложените податоци се чини дека приливите на странски директни инвестиции не се тесно
поврзани со извозната ориентираност на земјата што е спротивно од очекуваното имајќи предвид
дека странските компании се воедно извозни компании.
Is there a connection between FDI and GDP, and does state aid affect FDI decisions? 106
Moreover, we would like to assess whether there is a correlation between the GDP and FDI for the coun-
tries we have analyzed, and also to assess whether state aid affects decision making for FDI. This is im-
portant because we want to assess whether indirect state aid has helped GDP growth and through what
mechanism, but we also want to assess whether there are indications of deadweight loss, i.e. approval
and awarding of incentives to investors who would invest without incurring an opportunity cost, or to as-
sess whether there are indications for beggar-thy-neighbor, i.e. when countries try to outdo each other
in terms of incentives in order to attract investors. We evaluate a linear regression equation:
log (FDI) = α+β1 log (GDP) + β2 log (State aid) + ε
Of the available panel data for the following countries: Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Mon-
tenegro, Croatia and Slovenia. At the same time, the dependent variable "FDI" is the inflow of foreign
direct investments as a percentage of gross domestic product. The independent variables are "GDP", for
which we use the growth rate of gross domestic product, and "State aid", which is the allocated state aid
in the country as a percentage of gross domestic product.
Because the evaluation of panel regression coefficients depends on the stationary time series of the variables
before evaluating the regression, we performed Unit root tests for stationarity. The results of the Levin Lin
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106) Detailed calculations from the econometric analysis are available at the request of the reader.
and Chu test show stationarity of all variables in the regression, i.e. consistency in the process of generating
variables, with the data having an arithmetic mean and a variable that does not change over time.
For the purposes of selecting the correct model of calculation of panel regressions (model of fixed effects
versus model of random effects), we used Hausman's test, whereby the null hypothesis that the random
effect method is adequate for regression assessment was not rejected because the p- test value is 0.5860,
which is more than 5%.
Using the model of random effects, the assessed regression equation and the regression results are pre-
sented below (Table 7):
LOG (FDI)  = 0.2238 * LOG (GDP)  - 0.1851 * LOG (State Aid)  - 1.2863   
Тable 1: Results of regression analysis
Source: Calculation of authors, econometric package Eviews8.
The results of the linear regression analysis show that the model has a low coefficient of determination
or 0.0954, which means that the independent variables incompletely explain the change of the dependent
variable, i.e. there are no variables left in the model. However, this is not an academic-formal analysis,
but a policy analysis for us and these results are enough for us to show indicative knowledge. 
The results show that there is a positive correlation between foreign direct investment and the growth
of gross domestic product, but also between foreign direct investment and the granted state aid in the
country. 
The results of the Granger causality test indicate that there is a one-way causality between the variable
GDP growth rate and foreign direct investments with a time delay of six periods - the GDP growth trend
predicts the FDI trend. In addition, the results of the Granger causality test indicate one-way causality
between the variable state aid and foreign direct investment with a time delay of two periods - the trend
in the granted state aid predicts the trend in foreign direct investment.
These findings point to several things for decision makers. First, GDP growth affects FDI in companies
making their decisions to invest in this group of countries. This impact is likely to cover a longer period
of monitoring of the GDP situation by FDI. Second, state aid affects FDI attraction. It is natural for GDP
growth to attract FDI as relatively higher results are expected in faster-growing countries.
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Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value
GDP growth 0.2238 1.8504 0.0698
State aid 0.1851 1.9000 0.0628
Determination coefficient (R2) 0,0954
Conclusions 
The "race to the bottom" phenomenon occurs when countries reduce taxes on the one hand and increase
state aid for foreign companies on the other in order to attract more foreign direct investment in the coun-
try compared to neighboring countries. At the same time, if such policies are not adequately designed and
implemented in a transparent manner, they can cause erosion of public revenues in each of the countries
individually, but also regionally. This phenomenon is especially pronounced if at the same time foreign
direct investments do not contribute to an adequate increase of economic growth in the countries, i.e.
they do not cooperate with local suppliers and transfer profits from work and investments to the countries
of the parent companies. 
According to the findings of the literature review that analyzes foreign direct investment and state aid in
the region, state aid and tax relief as measures to attract foreign direct investment are effective only if
they are accompanied by quality institutions in functioning market economies and are awarded in a trans-
parent way under previously determined conditions that solve certain market imperfections or encourage
the realization of a certain social goal in the host country, such as reducing unemployment, developing
economically underdeveloped regions, or transferring technology and knowledge. In its regular progress
reports, the European Commission has for years pointed to non-transparency in the provision of state aid
in countries in the region.107 According to the conclusions of the European Commission,108 countries in the
region should make efforts to build functional and transparent institutions. Moreover, existing narrow
measures covering price criteria for attracting foreign direct investments (subsidies, low labor costs, direct
assistance for lower capital expenditures, etc.) should be expanded to retain existing investments by cre-
ating a second generation of structural reforms, which will result in permanent and sustainable working
conditions, mostly toward stabilizing the political environment, creating a predictable business climate,
reducing the perception of corruption, etc. 
The analysis findings show that countries in the region that have higher amounts of state aid also have a
higher inflow of foreign direct investment. However, it is also noteworthy that countries in the region with
higher economic growth have more foreign direct investments than lower-growth countries. On the other
hand, in contrast to the generally accepted paradigm, the countries we consider and which have lower tax
rates also have lower inflows of foreign direct investments than countries with higher tax rates, which is
an indication of the race to the bottom in attracting FDI with narrow measures that they apply. In the lit-
erature this is known as beggar-thy-neighbor, when countries try to outdo each other in terms of incentives
(in this case, fiscal) in order to attract investors. Slovenia and Croatia are EU member states, and they are
better in the rule of law, transparency, and perception of corruption than North Macedonia, Montenegro
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is clear that these EU member states are using broad measures to attract
FDI compared to Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are using lower tax rates to
attract FDI. In other words, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina must pay a higher pre-
mium to attract FDI with lower taxes on the GDP due to their inability to compete with the rule of law,
corruption control, and trust in institutions with Croatia and Slovenia. This leads these countries to choose
the beggar-thy-neighbor practice, meaning they try to outdo each other in terms of incentives to attract
investors, which is a race to the bottom. 
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107) 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-communication-on-eu-enlargement-policy_en.pdf and EC country progress reports for
different years (2016-2019)
108) Ibid.
In the long run, policy makers in North Macedonia should keep in mind that higher tax countries have
higher public revenues, and thus higher investments in infrastructure and education, which are key to at-
tracting sustainable FDIs. The ratio of tax revenues (not counting mandatory social contributions) and the
GDP of countries in the region compared to the EU and OECD countries is significantly lower, and while
this ratio at the EU level is ~27%, in the region this indicator ranges from ~18% to 20% depending on the
country and the year.
While the Western Balkan region is characterized by low profit tax and personal income tax, it should be
noted that there were no additional tax rate reductions, on the contrary in 2013 Serbia and in 2014 Albania
increased profit tax rates by five percentage points. As profit tax and personal income tax rates have not
changed during the analyzed period, and the amounts of state aid as a percentage of the gross domestic
product have stagnated, while the regional state aid average as a percentage of the GDP is below the av-
erage of European Union countries, we can say that there are indications that the region has currently
reached the bottom of the "race to the bottom", without suggesting that the risk of recurrence is reduced. 
The granting of state aid without transparent procedures entails discretionary spending of public funds,
especially in the absence of quality analysis of costs and contributions from foreign companies receiving
state aid. Moreover, the lack of effective national oversight and regional cooperation in the field of state
aid control is an indicator that countries trying to attract foreign direct investment without having a com-
mon strategy and goals in the field of state aid control can compete with each other and easily fall into
the "race to the bottom" trap. The absence of these oversight and cooperation mechanisms is critical and
poses a kind of threat to the region from the "race to the bottom" phenomenon. Sometimes it is possible,
due to non-transparency and improper supervision of state aid, to approve and grant state aid to FDI that
would have invested in the country without it, which leads to high opportunity costs and to the so-called
deadweight loss. 
Empirical analysis of the relationship between the variables inflow of foreign direct investments, growth of
gross domestic product, and state aid shows that there is a positive correlation between foreign direct in-
vestment and growth of gross domestic product, but also between foreign direct investments and state
aid. The causality test showed that with a time lag of six periods, the trend in gross domestic product
growth predicted the trend in foreign direct investment. Moreover, the results of the Granger causality
test indicate one-way causality between the variables state aid and foreign direct investment with a time
delay of two periods, meaning the trend in the granted state aid predicts the trend in foreign direct in-
vestments. Hence, we suggest that the empirical analysis of the sample countries for the analyzed period,
shows that state aid positively affects FDI attraction in the short term, however that in the long run for-
eign companies direct their capital to countries with high growth rates. On the other hand, this may in-
directly mean that sustainable FDIs look for stable and developed markets with rule of law and where
there is trust in the institutions and which, in addition to narrow measures and state aid, require broader
measures for adequate and efficient business market economy conditions. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICIES
Foreign investment is an important catalyst for the development of the host country, and thus Western
Balkan countries offer various incentive policies as a way to attract foreign direct investment. The incen-
tives offered to investors include various fiscal measures from tax cuts, tax exemptions to subsidizing
the investment, as well as non-fiscal measures that prioritize foreign investors. One of the most widely
used instruments for attracting investment in the Western Balkans is that of free economic zones. There
are around forty FEZ in the Western Balkans, most of them in the RN of Macedonia and Serbia, which is
probably beyond the economic justification for such a number. As more countries start to operationalize
them, there is an increasing risk of mutual competition based on state aid, and of the adverse effects on
all affected economies in the region that are part of the mutual "race" for foreign investments.109 In order
to reduce the potentially negative effects of the race, which generates inefficiencies and ineffectiveness,
we believe that regional policies need to alter their manner of attracting foreign investments:
1) Regional approach to attracting foreign investments: 
- Implementation of regional policy for attracting foreign investments and creation of a system, fol-
lowed by a system for essential assessment of the value, effect and impact while considering the
principles of free competition and effective state aid control. As such, policy makers need to rethink
the added value of such parallel economies to which different rules apply.
- The need for regional cooperation and access have already been identified in EU-supported regional
plans. Countries in the region should not distort, delay or circumvent the principles of free compe-
tition, state aid control and transparency due to their inability to establish an efficient system and
oversight, or "delay" the necessary changes for full EU membership. 
- State aid may be a factor contributing to investment in the region. However, policy makers need to
weigh the benefits of such incentive-backed investments and the possible spill overs in the domestic
and regional economies, as well as all associated expenses and lost revenues from tax exemptions.
These assessments should also consider the sustainability of the investments, especially because of
the risk that companies may decide to relocate after the “ending” of the incentive periods.
- The potential negative impacts of encouraging regional competition in the race for foreign investment
through incentives require intensified regional dialogue. Because economies are not required to ad-
here to a specific package of incentives at this pre-accession stage until they reach the EU's state
aid limits, there is a possibility of distorting effects with a negative impact both on domestic and in-
ternational competition, which can lead to unsustainable investments. 
2) Efforts to improve the investment and business environment through non-selective law enforcement, 
predictability of the regulations, stability and accountability: 
- The WB region has significant competitive advantages outside of the direct incentives such as its
proximity to the EU market, free trade agreements with the EU and other countries outside the EU,
already low tax rates and relatively cheap skilled labor. But at the same time, it is a region facing
challenges in terms of the rule of law, predictability of regulations, political stability, policy pre-
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109) Montenegro has one free zone, but in terms of % of FDI from GDP, it is significantly above other countries in the region.
dictability, corruption, labor market challenges, and others, which are the primary factors contributing
to investors' decisions on where to locate investments and focus on their promotion. 
- Recognition of the importance of broader measures to attract FDI, namely the rule of law, trust in
institutions, corruption control, building adequate infrastructure, and improving the quality of the
education system according to the needs of the labor market, as key in the process of building an
image of an attractive destination for foreign companies.
3) Greater efficiency in control and effectiveness in granting state aid:
- Conducting adequate ex-ante and ex-post evaluations and analyses of all projects to which state aid
is granted, in order to assess the performance and the degree of the objectives achieved. The rec-
ommendation remains that the strategy for attracting FDI should be improved in order to sustain
the existing investments by creating a new generation of structural reforms that will not be based
on narrow fiscal measures110
4) Greater transparency and accountability in state aid policies:
- The policy creators, policy makers, control and oversight should ensure accountability in front of the
taxpayers for the economic justification of the allocated public funds and their contribution to the
economy as the "best" chosen mechanism, as opposed to other possible alternatives to attracting
investments. 
- Countries in the region need to enhance their efforts to improve the level of transparency in the
provision of state aid, strengthen the role of control bodies, better the effectiveness of parliamentary
oversight, and increase the role of civil society in monitoring state aid.
- Clarity and transparency of the criteria and procedures for granting state aid, the selection of recip-
ients and the justification of the costs. Transparency and the availability of information are needed
not only regarding the allocated amounts of state aid, but also for the analysis of the costs and ben-
efits of the granted state aid.
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110) See more https://cea.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/1.-Analiza-Benefiti-od-FDI-TIRZ-Makedonija.pdf
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